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Abstract
Enhancing Automated Network Management
by
Huazhe Wang
Network management benefits from automated tools. With the recent advent of software-
defined principles, automated tools have been proposed from both industry and academia
to fulfill function components in the network management control loop. While automa-
tion aims to accommodate the ever increasing network diversity and dynamics with
improved reliability and management efficiency, it also brings new concerns as it’s be-
coming more difficult to understand the control of the network and operators cannot
rely on traditional troubleshooting tools. Meanwhile, how to effectively integrate new
automation tools with existing legacy networks remains a question. This dissertation
presents efficient methods to address key functionalities within the control loop in the
adaption of automated network management.
Identifying the network-wide forwarding behaviors of a packet is essential for many
network management tasks, including policy enforcement, rule verification, and fault
localization. We start by presenting AP Classifier. AP Classifier was developed based
on the concept of atomic predicates which can be used to characterize the forwarding
behaviors of packets. There is an increasing trend that enterprises outsource their Net-
work Function (NF) processing to a cloud to lower cost and ease management. To avoid
threats to the enterprise’s private information, we propose SICS based on AP Classifier,
a secure and dynamic NF outsourcing framework. Stateful NFs have become essential
parts of modern networks, increasing the complexity in network management. A ma-
jor step in network automation is to automatically translate high level network intents
into low level configurations. To ensure those configurations and the states generated
x
by automation match intents, we present Epinoia, a network intent checker for state-
ful networks. While the concept of auto-translation sounds promising, operators may
not know what intents should be. To close the control loop, we present AutoInfer to
automatically infer intents of running networks, which helps operators understand the
network runtime states.
xi
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Managing a large packet network is a complex task. The procedure of processing
packets is prone to faults from configuration errors and unexpected network dynam-
ics. The complexity also comes from the rapid growth in size and diversity of modern
networks, which include cloud (e.g., Amazon Web Service [3], Azure [15], Google
Cloud [8]), software-defined networks [24], mobile devices, Internet of Things as well
as traditional physical topologies. Network Functions (NFs) are a vital part of modern
networks. Compared with switches and routers, NFs implement more diverse func-
tions and their packet processing behavior may depend on the packet history previously
encountered. Examples of such stateful packet processing include firewalls that allow
inbound packets if they belong to established connections and web proxies that cache
popular content etc. NFs are becoming increasingly prevalent in today’s network, com-
plicating the problems encountered in network management [102]. Furthermore, net-
work configurations need to be continuously updated to serve the ever evolving business
goals to address both security and performance requirements. According to a study,
70% of network failures occurred during changing network configurations [69].
The increasing complexity of business rules and policies coupled with the increas-
ing size of modern networks has made the tasks of network operators extremely dif-
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ficult. With the advent of software-defined principles, automated platforms and tools
are proposed from both industry and academia to fullfil each function component in
the network management control loop. For instance, to translate diverse policies auto-
matically, [4,5,30,36,37,105] designed languages and specifications that can synthesis
network control/data plane configurations (e.g., BGP configurations). Towards more
reliable networks, [35,49,62,63,65,118,126] proposed formal analysis methods to ver-
ify essential network properties (e.g., The network has no routing loop for all packets.).
To gain awareness of the state of devices network wide, [39,83,107,108,120] proposed
runtime monitoring schemes to automatically collect network telemetry data. While
network automation eases tasks for operators, there are still many challenges to make
those automated tools both efficient and reliable. In this dissertation, we identify some
of key functionalities that are missing in existing automated platforms.
Network-wide packet behavior identification. Let a flow be an equivalence class
of packets defined on a subset of fields in the packet header, e.g., the 5-tuple consisting
of source address, destination address, source port, destination port, and protocol type.
All packets of a flow have the same forwarding behaviors in a network (also referred to
as the flow’s behaviors) when there is no update. Network-wide packet behavior iden-
tification is a function that discovers the actual forwarding behaviors of the packets in a
flow (or a set of flows) including their forwarding paths, where they stop or are dropped,
and which boxes they traverse, by analyzing network state [59]. Packet behavior iden-
tification is essential for network management tasks such policy enforcement [96,125],
verification of flow properties [34, 73] and network fault localization [123, 127]. A
practical packet behavior identification method must satisfy three requirements. First,
it provides a high throughput in responding to packet behavior queries. According
to recent measurement results [38, 61], a large data center network may see hundreds
of thousands of new flows per second. SDNs should support hundreds of data plane
2
updates per second [60] and each update may need to query multiple flows to verify
correctness. Hence a desired throughput should exceed one million packet queries per
second (1 Mqps). Second, the query structure should fit into a small and fast memory
such as cache. Third, the query structure can be updated in real time under data plane
changes to ensure that query results reflect the current network state.
Unfortunately, none of the existing solutions can meet all of the requirements stated
above. A straightforward approach is to maintain copies of the flow tables for all boxes
in the controller. However even for a medium-scale network used in [63], tens of GBs
are required to store all rules [59]. Due to slow search speed among flow tables and
disk I/Os, the resulting query throughput is very low. Very recently, [59] propose to use
a multi-valued decision diagram (MDD) to classify flows to different sets of network-
wide behaviors. However, one limitation is that an MDD cannot be updated in real
time.1
Secure and dynamic middlebox outsourcing. While traditionally, middleboxes
a.k.a network functions, have been deployed as dedicated hardware devices inside an
enterprise, the introduction of the Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) technol-
ogy [57] and the cloud services has opened a new opportunity to outsource middleboxes
to third-party clouds. An initial effort [102] indicates that middlebox outsourcing can
be achieved without significantly impacting performance. Recently, there are also some
industrial companies and communities working on providing in-cloud traffic process-
ing capabilities [20, 28, 29]. However, it brings up an obvious concern about privacy,
because in the new model, both the cloud provider and the middlebox provider may see
the user’s traffic and the middlebox rules, which may contain sensitive user informa-
tion. For example, rules of a firewall contain sensitive information such as what traffic
1The paper [59] claims that if a data plane update does not change the existing packet behaviors,
MDD update can be finished in tens of milliseconds. However from examining update traces of the
Route Views Project [26], it is unlikely that a data plane update does not change the existing packet
behaviors.
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is not welcome, and its leakage could expose a severe security hole. How to perform
generic computing in the cloud while keeping the privacy of data has been studied ex-
tensively. The introduction of the hardware enclaves (e.g., Intel SGX [81]) provides
a way to perform generic private computation; it can verify the binary before running
it and can encrypt data before storing the data to enclave memory. However, this ap-
proach assumes one knows the hash of a correct binary [90] and thus cannot prevent a
curious middlebox provider from leaving a backdoor in the middlebox. Moreover, cur-
rent implementations of enclaves still suffer from side channel attacks [116]. In another
approach, the user can encrypt packets before sending them to the cloud/middleboxes,
and previous works have studied how middleboxes can perform computation over en-
crypted data. These solutions are usually not generic, but it turns out that most middle-
box functionalities only need a limited number of operations. For example, keyword
matching, which is widely used for intrusion detection, can be performed efficiently
over encrypted data [104, 122].
One key challenge of the cryptographic approaches is how to handle packet head-
ers. Headers are involved in both middlebox processing and traffic steering [96, 125]
(e.g., route all HTTP traffic through firewall-IDS-proxy), which need to detect whether
or not an address lies within a range of values (e.g., if a header belongs to a prefix).
With traditional IP addresses, one can implement such a rule matching efficiently by
aggregating IPs from the same subnet because they share the same prefix. When head-
ers are encrypted, however, such prefix property is lost, and building a lookup table
using keyword matching, though possible, will create a memory explosion. More-
over, because of the dynamic nature of the network, the matching rules may change
at runtime, and an ideal solution should not incur high overhead when the network
configuration is changed. In summary, an ideal mechanism to handle packet headers
should achieve three properties. First, the cloud and middlebox should be able to fulfill
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its functionalities without learning the user’s packet headers. Second, the mechanism
should incur low processing overhead at both the enterprise side and the middlebox
side, so that they can process packets at high speed. The mechanism should not con-
sume much extra bandwidth because cloud providers usually charge traffic redirected
to the cloud by volume. Third, allow operators to frequently modify network config-
urations (e.g., rerouting traffic to backup middlebox instances; changing the Access
Control Lists (ACLs) of a firewall) to perform tasks, ranging from traffic engineering
to patching security vulnerabilities [98]. SDN/NFV provides the ability to update a
middlebox instance or launch a new one and reroute traffic to the new instance in a
matter of milliseconds [79]. To support frequent rule updates, an ideal secure middle-
box outsourcing mechanism should be able to update incrementally, i.e. the overhead of
performing such an update should be proportional to the number of rules to be changed.
So far, none of the existing mechanisms can achieve all of the properties listed.
Checking network intents for stateful networks. Intent-Based Networking (IBN) [13]
is the new advent in network automation. IBN aims to make networks more reliable
and efficient by automatically converting network-wide objectives, called intents (e.g.,
all critical services in the data center are available to remote sites) into detailed network
configurations that implement those intents. While IBN eases the configuration task
for network administrators, it faces several challenges. The first challenge is handling
undetected bugs and inaccuracies in the automation logic itself given that the need to
dealing with the diversity of network devices and services effectively is hard. The sec-
ond challenge is the subjective nature of intents, which cannot be completely fulfilled
by automation and might need human intervention to provide input or make changes
that are not supported by the automation framework.
Stateful networks refer to the networks that contain stateful NFs. According to a
survey in [91], 43% of network intent violations involve NFs, and between 4% and
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15% of them are the result of NF misconfiguration. However, recent work on network
verification either only ensures correct NF traversal assuming all instances of each type
of NFs are equally and correctly configured [35, 52, 63], or only checks NF configura-
tions in a restricted scope that may lose end-to-end expressiveness and accuracy [88].
We have identified three key requirements of an intent checking system for stateful
networks: First, vendor-agnostic model specifications to support diverse NFs and their
configurations from different vendors. Second, completeness to support end-to-end in-
tent checking, to handle packet header modifications by NFs and routing dynamics,
and Third, Incremental checking to efficiently check correctness to avoid performing
full checking for every change. Existing network verification work consists of two ap-
proaches: The customized approaches, such as HSA [63] and its real-time version,
NetPlumber [62], identify the set of packets affected by the network changes and uti-
lize customized path-based algorithms to calculate their new forwarding paths. This
approach is unable to model extra packet sequences from other parts of the network
and thus cannot be used for stateful networks. The solver-based approaches, such
as Minesweeper [35] and VMN [88], encode all possible packet behavior within the
network using first-order logic. To achieve scalability with modern solvers, such as
SAT [78] and SMT (Satisfiability Modulo Theories) [44], they rely on optimizations to
identify logically independent network slices. However, there is no guarantee that these
slices will always have moderate size or even exist, especially when there are NFs that
modify packet headers. Further, both Minesweeper and VMN solve all constraints as a
whole, and cannot reuse previous checking results when the network changes.
Automated network intent inference. While the above intent statements appear
promising and straightforward, creating or updating intents may be challenging for mul-
tiple reasons. Firstly, the operator may not be aware of what the intent is or to which
endpoints the labels in an intent refer (e.g., where is the “secure zone”, “conferenc-
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ing application”, etc?) because the operator may be a novice, or because the original
architects of the network are no longer available and the documentation is poor. This
covers a common scenario in the upgrade procedure of legacy networks to IBN since
those networks were originally built without having formally defined intents stored in
the system. Recently, some advanced platforms provide centralized interfaces for oper-
ators to ease the management of network-wide configurations [4, 5], but they still lack
visibility of existing running intents implemented in underlying networks. Even if the
operator knows what the intent should be, the network may be very large and have
many goals, so it would take significant time to describe all intents, which may number
in the hundreds or thousands.
Recent advances in network verification are able to formally verify network control
and data plane to efficiently check for unwanted behavior efficiently. Therefore, an in-
tuitive approach to infer intents is to look at those configurations as they are supposed
to implement the original network intents. However, configurations may not reflect the
network runtime states. Indeed, configurations are usually installed by multiple opera-
tors to address different business goals on a long time scale. In practice, configurations
often contain a large amount of outdated snippets and mixed residues of obsolete poli-
cies [16]. Therefore, inferring network intents solely based on configurations may incur
inaccurate and misleading results. To help operators learn the high level insights of run-
time states, [39] proposed to run a sophisticated heuristic over the whole network-wide
packet forwarding records to extract a summary of the network runtime state. This
method may require a large storage capacity to store all forwarding behavior and is not
suitable for online use. A more commonly adopted approach to understand runtime
states by network operators is random packet sampling. By design, random sampling
provides no guarantee on which traffic flows will be sampled, by which router and at
what time. Except for a few heavy-hitters [124], even minutes-long collections of ran-
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Throughput
Minimum Overhead
(per packet)
Incremental
Update
Function
Chain Security Guarantee
Melis et al. [82] very low 119 Bytes 7 7 high
Embark [71] high 20 Bytes 7 3
Possible leakage of
packet headers and rules
Splitbox [33] medium > 2× traffic 7 7 Possible leakage ofpacket headers and rules
SafeBricks [90] < Embark - 7 3 Side-channel attack
SICS > Embark 4 Bytes 3 3 high
Table 1.1: Comparison of existing secure middlebox outsourcing schemes.
dom samples typically provide coarse-grained and inaccurate bandwidth estimations
for the large majority of flows.
1.1 Overview of Dissertation
This dissertation presents methods to address the above challenges and missing
functionalities. The dissertation is comprised of four parts:
• We present a network-wide packet behavior identification tool called AP Classi-
fier, where AP stands for Atomic Predicates, a concept developed in [118]. Each
atomic predicate specifies a set of packets that have the same forwarding behav-
ior in the network. The motivation of using atomic predicates is stated as follows.
Existing solutions of packet behavior identification that use forwarding table sim-
ulation or BDD-like structures [42] are slow in processing queries and memory-
inefficient because every bit of the packet header is considered. The concept of
atomic predicates [118] provides a way to compress ACLs and forwarding rules
to a small set of equivalence classes that can be specified efficiently. We hence
develop a novel data structure, called AP Tree, to classify packets into atomic
predicates which allows us to eliminate the primary cause of inefficiency by us-
ing a BDD-like structure to analyze packet flow behavior. The packet behavior
can then be easily computed using the atomic predicate. To further increase the
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performance, AP Classifier employs optimized construction algorithms, so that
the constructed AP Tree achieves higher query throughput. To deal with network
dynamics, AP Classifier utilizes a real-time update to maintain query correctness
and an AP Tree reconstruction method that periodically rebuilds the tree to opti-
mize its performance. We evaluated the performance of AP Classifier using the
data plane network state, including forwarding tables and ACLs, from two real
networks: Internet2 [14] and a Stanford campus network [63]. Our results show
that AP Classifier, running on a general-purpose desktop computer, uses only a
few MBs memory and supports more than two millions of queries per second. In
addition it can be updated in real time (< 4 ms for 95% updates in Internet2 and
< 1 ms for 95% updates in Stanford).
• We present a middlebox outsourcing scheme SICS, short for Secure In-Cloud
Service chaining. SICS protects the private information of packet headers and
rules by only allowing packets with encrypted headers into the cloud. However,
encrypted headers cannot be used for forwarding and middlebox rule matching.
Inspired by the concept of forwarding equivalence classes in packet forwarding
networks [112, 118], SICS assigns a label to each encrypted packet. Each label
uniquely identifies the forwarding and rule-matching behavior of the packet. To
apply forwarding equivalence classes for middlebox outsourcing, there are key
domain-specific challenges. First, middlebox policies typically require a set of
packets to go through a sequence of middleboxes, which is called a service func-
tion chain [23]. Those independently specified polices should be efficiently com-
bined for packets that are subject to multiple requirements. Second, most middle-
boxes employ stateful processing and may modify packet headers (e.g., a source
NAT converts internal addresses to external ones). However, forwarding equiva-
lence classes can only analyze forwarding behavior of static networks [112] and
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cannot be directly used to handle the complexity and dynamics in middlebox
chaining. To address these challenges, we first logically group packets with the
same middlebox processing chain and actions into policy equivalence classes and
thus we eliminate the need to assign a unique label to every single flow. Second,
building on configurations for header transformation, we propose a label-to-label
replacement scheme. The new labels correspond to the new modified headers
and are used for subsequent processing. Table 1.1 summarizes results from eval-
uations and compares SICS with the four recent secure middlebox outsourcing
schemes in five desired properties: throughput, bandwidth overhead, incremen-
tal update, service function chaining, and security guarantee. SICS achieves all
of the desired properties, while every other design contains several weaknesses.
Note that SICS focuses on how to handle packet headers securely. Similar to
previous work [71], SICS is compatible to existing secure Deep Packet Inspec-
tion (DPI) over encrypted traffic and can be perfectly combined with existing
methods [104, 122] to handle the whole packet securely.
• We present Epinoia, an intent checker for stateful networks. Table 1.2 shows a
comparison of Epinoia with other related work in terms of support for the key
requirements described above. To the best of our knowledge, Epinoia is the only
system that can fully support all the key requirements. Epinoia includes a novel
configuration model for NF function units represented as vendor-agnostic exten-
sions of OpenConfig YANG models [84] that can be combined to represent con-
figurations of commercial advanced NFs [87]. We propose new techniques lever-
aging causality precedence relationships [97] between packet I/Os and NF states
to represent stateful NF operating logic. Efficiency is achieved by the design of a
scalable yet correct approach for intent checking based on intent decomposition
and incremental checking using a novel causality graph memoization technique
10
for all checked results. We have conducted a comprehensive evaluation of Epin-
ioa using a real-world dataset and topologies. Epinioa can perform incremental
checking within a few seconds per network and/or intent update which reduces
the time cost by up to a factor of 100x compared to an exhaustive checking for
all intents.
• We present AutoInfer, a tool that infers intents of a running network automati-
cally, and serves as a starting point for operators to update existing or create new
network intents. AutoInfer exploits the possibility to augment state of the art con-
figuration analysis techniques with runtime monitoring, by enabling fine-grained
measurement of potential intents obtained from configurations. AutoInfer coor-
dinates intent monitoring among switches and schedules small monitoring tasks
for selected intents, within hundreds of milliseconds. This enables AutoInfer to
efficiently capture accurate runtime intents. Endpoints sharing the same intents
are grouped together, suggesting operators can create new labels and reorganize
their networks. With AutoInfer intents are displayed in intent graphs following an
existing intent specification called the Policy Graph Abstraction (PGA) [92]. The
choice is motivated by the intuitive graph representation of network intents, sup-
port of network function boxes, and the fact that PGA ideas have been included in
the OpenDaylight (ODL) Network Intent Composition (NIC) project [18]. Even
with a reduced scope after analyzing configurations, determining which intent
to monitor, where and when, is still challenging. Biased strategies can lead to
poor coverage and inaccurate results (e.g., if all resources are used to monitor
intents with popular destinations). Conversely, strategies for strict fairness can
lead to wasted resources and slow answers (e.g., if many intents are inactive).
These are the challenges AutoInfer tackles on behalf of operators. Given the in-
tents obtained from configurations, it derives a set of aggregated intents and adds
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Table 1.2: Epinoia vs. other network verification tools
(#unsupported G#partial support  support )
Vendor-agnostic
NF models
Header
transformation
Incremental
checking
HSA/NetPlumber [63] [62] #   
Minesweeper [35] G# # #
VMN [88]  G# #
Epinoia    
them to the potential intents for monitoring. Then, it utilizes an adaptive monitor-
ing refinement scheme following three key ideas. First, AutoInfer decides what
(which intent) and where to monitor all potential intents, with objectives to max-
imize both intent coverage and switch resource utilization. Second, AutoInfer
adaptively refines the monitoring plan based on previous monitored results and
quickly narrows the monitoring tasks down to only active intents at the moment.
Third, for each monitoring plan change, AutoInfer runs a greedy heuristic that
utilizes intent information to minimize the number of monitoring spot changes,
reducing the communication overhead and time delay to reset monitoring tasks
on switches. Our evaluation results based on an AutoInfer prototype show that
AutoInfer quickly captures all active intents and increases monitoring efficiency
by at least 3.7x compared with a fixed schedule. We also show that AutoInfer
computes monitoring schedules for large networks, with hundreds of nodes in
tens of milliseconds and is therefore suitable for online use.
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Chapter 2
Practical Network-wide Packet
Behavior Identification by AP
Classifier
2.1 Model and Background
We model a network as a directed graph of boxes, each of which has a forwarding
table as well as input and output ports guarded by access control lists (ACLs). Each
packet has a fixed-size header, including all fields that are evaluated by forwarding
tables and ACLs in the network. A flow is then a sequence of packets that have the
same values in the evaluated header fields.
Following the concepts in [118], forwarding tables and ACLs are all packet filters.
Each ACL can be specified by a predicate. The set of packets that are allowed by the
ACL are evaluated to true by the predicate. Similarly, by analyzing a forwarding table,
each output port can be specified by a forwarding predicate. The set of packets that
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b1
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h1
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Figure 2.1: (a) Three predicates. (b) The packet header space and five atomic predi-
cates. (c) A sample network including the three predicates.
can be forwarded to the port are evaluated to true by the predicate.1 Forwarding tables
and ACLs can be converted to predicates using the algorithms in [118]. A predicate
P specifies the set of packets for which P evaluates to true. Hence if a packet can
travel through a sequence of packet filters, it is evaluated to true by the conjunction of
predicates corresponding to the packet filters.
Given a set of predicates, we can compute a set of atomic predicates. Due to space
limitation, we do not repeat the formal definition of atomic predicates, which can be
found in [118]. A proved property of the set of atomic predicates is that they specify
the minimum set of equivalence classes in the set of all packets. The packets that are
evaluated to true by the same atomic predicate have identical behaviors at all boxes.
For a set of predicates P = {p1, p2, ..., pk}, each atomic predicate ai is in the form
1All predicates are represented by binary decision diagrams (BDDs) [42] in our implementation of
AP Classifier.
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𝑝1 ¬𝑝1
𝑝2 ¬𝑝2
𝑝3 ¬𝑝3𝑝3
𝑝2 ¬𝑝2
¬𝑝3𝑝3 ¬𝑝3𝑝3¬𝑝3
𝑎2
𝑎2
𝑎2 𝑎4 𝑎3 𝑎1𝑎5
(a)
𝑝1 ¬𝑝1
𝑝2 ¬𝑝2
¬𝑝3𝑝3 ¬𝑝3𝑝3
𝑎2
𝑎4 𝑎3 𝑎1𝑎5
(b)
𝑝2 ¬𝑝2
𝑝3 ¬𝑝3 𝑝3 ¬𝑝3
¬𝑝1𝑝1
𝑎3
𝑎1𝑎2
𝑎4 𝑎5
(c)
Figure 2.2: AP Tree of predicates in Fig. 2.1(b). (a) Original AP Tree. (b) Pruned AP
Tree. (c) Optimized AP Tree.
ai = q1 ∧ q2 ∧ ... ∧ qk, where qj ∈ {pj,¬pj}. (Note that ai in the previous sentence is
an atomic predicate only if it is not false.) Every predicate is equal to the disjunction
of a subset of atomic predicates. Every packet is evaluated to true by one and only one
atomic predicate.
As an illustration, Fig. 2.1(a) shows three predicates p1 (triangle), p2 (square), and
p3 (circle), each of which represents a set of packets that are evaluated to true by a
predicate. Each predicate specifies a set of packets that can pass the corresponding
packet filter. Fig. 2.1(b) shows the three predicates in the packet header space. All
packets in this example can be classified into five equivalence classes specified by five
atomic predicates, a1 to a5. Each predicate is equal to the disjunction of a subset of
atomic predicates. For example, p2 = a3 ∨ a4. Also, a4 = ¬p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3. All packets
evaluated to true by a4 have identical behaviors: they can pass the filters of p2 and p3
but cannot pass p1.
In the network shown in Fig. 2.1(c), Let p1 specify the set of packets that can be
forwarded at box b1 to its output port to host h1, p2 specify the set of packets that can
be forwarded at box b1 to its output port to box b2, and p3 specify the set of packets
that can be forwarded at box b2 to its output port to host h2. A packet specified by
a4 = ¬p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3 is forwarded at b1 by the path b1− > b2− > h2. A packet specified
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by a5 = ¬p1 ∧¬p2 ∧ p3 is forwarded to h2 if it is at b2, but will be dropped if it is at b1.
An atomic predicate characterizes the behaviors of all packets it evaluates to true.
2.2 Design Framework of AP Classifier
AP Classifier is a program designed for a SDN controller. It computes the network-
wide behaviors for an input packet (or flow). AP Classifier performs two-stage process-
ing for a packet. First, using the AP Tree, it classifies the packet to the atomic predicate
that evaluates to true for the packet. Second, AP Classifier determines all forwarding
paths for the packet by using the atomic predicate, network information, and ingress
box of the packet.
2.2.1 AP Tree
Using the algorithms presented in [118], the controller first converts each ACL to a
predicate and the forwarding table of each box to m predicates, where m is the number
of output ports of the box. Let P = {p1, p2, ..., pk} be the set of predicates of all boxes
in the network. The controller constructs an AP Tree which is a binary tree. The root is
labeled by p1. At level i, the 2i internal nodes are each labeled by pi. Starting from the
root, at each internal node, the input packet is evaluated by the predicate in the label.
If the result is true, the packet continues to be evaluated in the left sub-tree. Otherwise
it goes to the right sub-tree. An AP Tree with (k + 1) levels can be constructed from
evaluating each of the k predicates at each level of internal nodes. A leaf node is then
labeled by q1 ∧ q2 ∧ ... ∧ qk, qi ∈ {pi,¬pi}, which specifies the set of packets reaching
the leaf. Fig. 2.2(a) shows the AP Tree of the three predicates in Fig. 2.1(b). Shaded
circles indicate leaf labels that are false. We will show that two sub-trees in an AP tree
do not necessarily have a same predicate order in Section 5.3.
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To classify a packet to an atomic predicate, AP Classifier simply searches the AP
Tree by evaluating the packet until the leaf labeled by the atomic predicate is found.
At each node, the packet is evaluated by checking the BDD of the predicate. Since
predicates on sibling nodes are disjoint, for a given packet, the path from the root to the
leaf is exclusive and determinate.
In the worst case, there could be 2k atomic predicates and finding a leaf needs to
evaluate all k predicates. However, it is found that the number of atomic predicates is
surprisingly small for real networks [118]. Hence many leaves specify empty sets of
packets. For example, in Fig. 2.2(a), p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3, p1 ∧ p2 ∧ ¬p3, and p1 ∧ ¬p2 ∧ p3
are all false according to the relationships in Fig. 2.1(b). Hence no packet can reach
any of these three leaves. We use the following rule to “prune” the AP Tree: If no
packet reaches a sub-tree, i.e., all leaves in the subtree are labeled by false predicates,
the sub-tree is removed from the AP Tree. If an internal node has only one child, it
is removed from the AP Tree as there is no need to check the predicate. We define
the depth of a leaf to be the number of predicates evaluated to reach the leaf. After
pruning, the average depth of all leaves in the AP Tree can be reduced and each node
has either 0 or 2 children. Fig. 2.2(b) shows the pruned AP Tree has average depth
(1 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3)/5 = 2.6.
An important observation is the following: If predicates are placed at the levels in
a different order, the average depth of the AP Tree may be different. In Fig. 2.2(c),
the predicates are placed at three levels in the order of p2, p3, p1. The average depth of
all leaves in the pruned AP Tree is 2.4. An important contribution of this work is an
algorithm to find an order of predicates that substantially reduces the average depth of
an AP Tree.
For examples, each of the Internet2 and Stanford networks includes hundreds of
thousands of forwarding rules, which can be converted to 161 (Internet2) or 507 (Stan-
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ford) predicates. Using our AP Tree construction algorithm, the average depth of the
AP Tree is only 10.6 (Internet2) or 16.8 (Stanford). In an unpruned AP Tree, a packet
needs to be evaluated by 161 or 507 predicates. AP Classifier only requires it to be
evaluated by 10.6 or 16.8 predicates, on average, thus improving the query through-
put by more than an order of magnitude. The detailed algorithm design of AP Tree
construction is presented in Section 2.3.
2.2.2 Computing packet behaviors
The second stage of AP Classifier determines the network-wide behaviors of the
queried packet from the network information, the ingress box, and the atomic predicate
determined in the first stage.
Since the atomic predicate is in the form q1 ∧ q2 ∧ ... ∧ qk, qi ∈ {pi,¬pi}, for any
predicate pj , AP Classifier can easily check whether the predicate evaluates to true or
false for the packet. Recall that pj represents a packet filter of an ACL or output port.
Hence AP Classifier can determine at any box whether the packet is dropped and which
port it is forwarded to. Starting from the ingress box, i.e., the box that sees the packet
first in the network, AP Classifier finds the output port to which the packet is forwarded
and then determines the next-hop box. If the packet is a multicast packet, it may be
forwarded to multiple ports. AP Classifier continues to find the forwarding ports on the
next-visited boxes until the packet reaches the destination or is dropped. The packet
behaviors are thus obtained.
Fig. 2.3 shows an example to illustrate how to compute network-wide forwarding
paths for a given packet. Consider a packet which arrives at the ingress box b1 and
it is classified to atomic predicate a4 by searching the AP Tree. The representation,
¬p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3, of a4 shows that the packet is forwarded to b2 because p1 is false and p2
is true for the packet. Similarly at b2, the packet is forwarded to h2 because p3 is true
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p1
p2
p3
b1
b2
h1
h2
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Forwarding path of a packet specified 
by a4 at ingress box b1
Figure 2.3: Computing forwarding path for a packet in a4
for the packet.
We ran experiments to evaluate the speed of the above approach on a general-
purpose desktop computer. We found that, for the Internet2 and Stanford datasets,
the throughput is greater than 15M and 10M packets per second, respectively. Note
that this throughput is much higher than the throughput in the first stage. Therefore, the
main effort of this work is to optimize the construction, search, and update of the AP
Tree.
2.3 AP Tree Optimization
The most challenging problem in designing AP Classifier is to construct an AP Tree
with minimized average depth, which can support dynamic updates.
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Figure 2.4: Query throughput versus average depth of leaves
2.3.1 Query throughput versus average depth
To reduce the query time and improve the query throughput, the optimization goal
of AP Tree construction is to reduce the average depth of leaves. We conduct a set of
experiments to justify the correlation of reducing the average depth and improving the
throughput. We use the Internet2 network containing 161 predicates and the Stanford
network containing 507 predicates. In each experiment, we randomly order the k pred-
icates for placement at levels of the AP Tree. Then we query the generated tree using
sample packets and measure the query throughput. In Fig. 2.4, we show the relation-
ship between query throughput and average depth for 100 random generated AP Trees
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for each network. After pruning, the average depth of the AP Tree of Internet2 varies
from 15.9 to 44.2, and the average depth of the AP Tree of Stanford varies from 39.1 to
92.5. From the two sub-figures in Fig. 2.4, it is obvious that an AP Tree with smaller
average depth provides higher query throughput. The star in each figure represents the
performance of the AP Tree constructed by AP Classifier. The query throughput of AP
Classifier is 3.35 Mqps (Internet2) and 1.82 Mqps (Stanford), substantially higher than
any random construction.
2.3.2 Quick-Ordering algorithm
The number of atomic predicates for a network is determinate if there is no update.
That is, for a network, its AP Tree has a fixed number of leaves. A more balanced binary
tree results in smaller average leaf depth. Compare the two AP Trees in Fig. 2.2(b) and
(c) whose average depths are 2.6 and 2.4, respectively. The one in Fig. 2.2(c) is more
balanced and hence has less average depth. The reason for the imbalance in Fig. 2.2(b)
is that p1 is placed at a higher level of the tree. According to properties of atomic
predicates, every predicate is equal to the disjunction of a subset of atomic predicates.
The number varies from one to the number of all atomic predicates. In this example,
p1 is a predicate that is equal to a single atomic predicate. Hence the left child of the
node labeled as p1 must be a leaf representing the atomic predicate. However, the right
sub-tree may include more levels, causing the imbalance.
In fact, an analysis of the two real network data planes shows that many predicates
are equal to a single atomic predicate. One fast yet effective ordering of predicates is
to place those predicates at lower levels. For example, in Fig. 2.2(c), p1 is placed at the
lowest level.
Notation. Let R(p) denote the subset of atomic predicates whose disjunction is p.
|R(p)| denotes the cardinality of R(p).
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In the Quick-Ordering algorithm, |R(pi)| is counted for each predicate pi. Then the
AP Tree is constructed by placing all predicates onto the tree in descending order of
|R(pi)|.
2.3.3 Optimized AP Tree construction
a6
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
(a)
𝑝2 ¬𝑝2
𝑝3 ¬𝑝3 𝑝3 ¬𝑝3
¬𝑝1𝑝1
𝑎3
𝑎1
𝑎4 𝑎5
¬𝑝4𝑝4
𝑎6 𝑎2
(b)
𝑝2 ¬𝑝2
𝑝3 ¬𝑝3 𝑝1 ¬𝑝1
¬𝑝3𝑝3
𝑎3
𝑎1𝑎5
𝑎4
¬𝑝4𝑝4
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Figure 2.5: Additional example. (a) Five predicates. (b) Pruned AP Tree. (c) Opti-
mized AP Tree.
To develop a more sophisticated ordering method, one important observation is
that, for two sub-trees whose roots are siblings, their predicate orders can be different.
In the example of Fig. 2.5(a), we now have four predicates p1 (triangle), p2 (square),
p3 (circle), and p4 (ellipse), which determine six atomic predicates, a1 to a6. If the
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predicates are added in the order p2, p3, p1, p4, the pruned AP Tree is shown in Fig.
2.5(b). However, for the sub-tree rooted at the right child of the root, its subtree is more
balanced if the predicate order is p1, p3, p4, as shown in Fig. 2.5(c).
For a given set of predicates P = {p1, p2, ..., pk}, the atomic predicates A =
{a1, a2, ..., an} is determined. The number of leaves of the AP Tree is n, because each
leaf corresponds to an atomic predicate. We define F (Q,S) as the minimal sum of leaf
depths of the subtree (which is a part of the AP Tree) whose nodes include the set of
predicatesQ and leaves are the set of atomic predicates S. In the example of Fig. 2.5(c),
let Q = {p1, p3, p4} and S = {a1, a2, a5, a6}, F (Q,S) = 8. F (Q,S) can be calculated
recursively using the following equations. Let H(Q,S, p) be the minimal sum of leaf
depths if the root of the sub-tree is p. If S∩R(p) 6= ∅ and S∩R(¬p) 6= ∅, H(Q,S, p)
is the sum of three components: F (Q − {p}, S ∩ R(p)) and F (Q − {p}, S ∩ R(¬p))
are recursive computing for the left and right sub-trees and extra |S| needs to be added
because the depth of every leaf increments by 1. We have
H(Q,S, p) = F (Q− {p}, S ∩R(p)) + F (Q− {p}, S ∩R(¬p)) + |S|
If S∩R(p) = ∅, the left sub-tree will be pruned. The internal node with only one child
is also removed and the leaf depths do not increase. Hence,
H(Q,S, p) = F (Q− {p}, S ∩R(¬p))
Similarly, if S ∩R(¬p) = ∅, we have,
H(Q,S, p) = F (Q− {p}, S ∩R(p))
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In addition, we have the following recursive equation.
F (Q,S) =

0 if |S|= 1
minpi∈QH(Q,S, pi) otherwise
(2.1)
When |S|= 1, it is easy to see that the sub-tree contains only one leaf, hence F (Q,S) =
0. Otherwise, the predicate pi ∈ Q is selected as the root of the sub-tree such that pi
minimizes H(Q,S, pi).
Using the above formula, it is possible to compute F (P,A). By recording the se-
lection of pi at each recursion, the optimized AP Tree can also be constructed.
However, the time complexity of solving this recursion is as high as O((2k) ∗ k! ),
where k is the cardinality of P . We need to propose an efficient heuristic algorithm
to simplify the recursion. At a level of recursion, we need to find the predicate pi that
minimizes H(Q,S, pi). Instead of trying all predicates, we propose an easier way to
decide which predicate to select.
We define a pair-wise relation between two predicates that implies which one is
better to select. If H(Q,S, pi) < H(Q,S, pj), we say that pi is superior to pj and pj is
inferior to pi, denoted as pi
S→ pj . If H(Q,S, pi) = H(Q,S, pj), we say pi and pj are
in the same order, denoted as pi
S∼ pj .
We compare two predicates in four cases based on their logical relationships, as
shown in Fig. 2.6. Here, pi and pj refer to predicates which are equal to union of
atomic predicates in S ∩ R(pi) and S ∩ R(pj) respectively. H(Q,S, p) is calculated
based on the first three equations of section 2.3.3 for all four cases as follows:
1) Packets specified by pi intersect with those of pj (Fig. 2.6(a)). If we place pi to
the root and pj to the children of the root, we get a full sub-tree since R(pi) ∩ R(pj),
R(pi) ∩ R(¬pj), R(¬pi) ∩ R(pj) and R(¬pi) ∩ R(¬pj) are all non-empty. Hence, we
have
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(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
pjpi pi pj
pi pjpjpi
Figure 2.6: Relationships of two predicates. (a) Neither Pi∧Pj nor ¬Pi∧¬Pj is false.
(b) Pi ∧ Pj is false. (c) ¬Pi ∧ Pj is false. (d) Pi ∧ ¬Pj is false.
H(Q,S, pi) = |S|+F (Q− {pi}, S ∩R(pi))
+ F (Q− {pi}, S ∩R(¬pi))
= |S|+F (Q− {pi, pj}, S ∩R(pi) ∩R(pj))
+ F (Q− {pi, pj}, S ∩R(pi) ∩R(¬pj))
+ |S ∩R(pi)|
+ F (Q− {pi, pj}, S ∩R(¬pi) ∩R(pj))
+ F (Q− {pi, pj}, S ∩R(¬pi) ∩R(¬pj))
+ |S ∩R(¬pi)|
If we place pj to the root and pi to the children, we can get H(Q,S, pj) similarly. Since
|S∩R(pi)|+|S∩R(¬pi)|= |S∩R(pj)|+|S∩R(¬pj)|= |S|,H(Q,S, pi) = H(Q,S, pj).
We have pi
S∼ pj .
2) Packets specified by pi disjoint with those of pj (Fig. 2.6(b)). pi ∧ pj is false.
If we place pi to the root and pj to the children of the root, the sub-tree representing
R(pi) ∩ R(pj) will be pruned. The child representing R(pi) ∩ R(¬pj) will replace
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its parent node and leaf depths do not increase. However, the sub-tree representing
R(¬pi) ∩ R(pj) and R(¬pi) ∩ R(¬pj) are both non-empty, so the total leaf depths
increase by |S ∩R(¬pi)|. Hence
H(Q,S, pi) = |S|+F (Q− {pi, pj}, S ∩R(pi) ∩R(¬pj))
+ F (Q− {pi, pj}, S ∩R(¬pi) ∩R(pj))
+ F (Q− {pi, pj}, S ∩R(¬pi) ∩R(¬pj))
+ |S ∩R(¬pi)|
Similarly, if we place pj to the root and pi to the children,
H(Q,S, pj) = |S|+F (Q− {pi, pj}, S ∩R(pj) ∩R(¬pi)))
+ F (Q− {pi, pj}, S ∩R(¬pj) ∩R(pi))
+ F (Q− {pi, pj}, S ∩R(¬pj) ∩R(¬pi))
+ |S ∩R(¬pj)|
Despite of the same terms, if |S ∩R(¬pi)|< |S ∩R(¬pj)|, pi S→ pj . If |S ∩R(¬pi)|=
|S ∩R(¬pj)|, pi S∼ pj . Otherwise pj S→ pi.
3) Packets specified by pj are a subset of those of pi (Fig. 2.6(c)). ¬pi ∧ pj is false.
If we place pi to the root and pj to the children of the root, the sub-tree representing
R(¬pi)∩R(pj) will be pruned. The child representingR(¬pi)∩R(¬pj) will replace its
parent node and leaf depths do not increase. The sub-tree representing R(pi) ∩ R(pj)
and R(pi) ∩ R(¬pj) are non-empty, so the total leaf depths increase by |S ∩ R(pi)|.
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Hence
H(Q,S, pi) = |S|+F (Q− {pi, pj}, S ∩R(pi) ∩R(pj))
+ F (Q− {pi, pj}, S ∩R(pi) ∩R(¬pj))
+ F (Q− {pi, pj}, S ∩R(¬pi) ∩R(¬pj))
+ |S ∩R(pi)|
If we place pj to the root and pi to the children of the root, the sub-tree representing
R(pj) ∩R(¬pi) will be pruned.
H(Q,S, pj) = |S|+F (Q− {pi, pj}, S ∩R(pj) ∩R(pi)))
+ F (Q− {pi, pj}, S ∩R(¬pj) ∩R(pi))
+ F (Q− {pi, pj}, S ∩R(¬pj) ∩R(¬pi))
+ |S ∩R(¬pj)|
Therefore if |S∩R(pi)|< |S∩R(¬pj)|, pi S→ pj . If |S∩R(pi)|= |S∩R(¬pj)|, pi S∼ pj .
Otherwise pj
S→ pi.
4) Packets specified by pi are a subset of those of pj (Fig. 2.6(d)). Similar to the
above cases, we can get if |S ∩ R(¬pi)|< |S ∩ R(pj)|, pi S→ pj . If |S ∩ R(¬pi)|=
|S ∩R(pj)|, pi S∼ pj . Otherwise pj S→ pi.
We then design the key criterion of predicate selection for each level of recursion,
namely: We select a predicate that is not inferior to any other predicate. The algorithm
is presented as follows: For each level of recursion, a predicate ps is maintained, ini-
tially being p1. A linear scan is performed from p2 to pk. For a predicate pi, if pi
S→ ps,
then ps is set to pi. At the end, ps is selected as the root node of the subtree for this
level of recursion.
To prove the correctness of the above algorithm, we need to show that ps is indeed
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not inferior to any other predicate. A sufficient condition is that the superior/inferior
relation is acyclic, i.e., there are no three predicates pa, pb, pc such that pa
S→ pb, pb S→
pc, and pc
S→ pa. We have proved the acyclic property by exhaustion. Our proof is not
shown herein due to space limitation.
Time efficiency of AP Tree construction. In the AP Tree construction algorithm
presented above, we avoid the time-intensive operation of computing the conjunction of
two predicates represented as BDDs. Instead, our algorithm computes the intersection
of two sets of integers that are identifiers of atomic predicates, as suggested in [118].
Intersections of integer sets can be computed much more quickly than conjunctions of
BDDs. Each predicate is represented as a set of integers, so the time complexity of
determining relationship between two predicates is O(n), where n is the number of
atomic predicates. For each level of recursion, a linear scan needs O(k′n) time, where
k′ is the number of predicates in the current level. The overall complexity of building
an AP Tree depends on the number of levels as well as the balance of the tree. Here we
only provide the complexity analysis for a balanced AP Tree. For a balanced AP Tree,
there are 2l nodes at level l. For each node, k′ ≤ (k − l). Hence at level l, the time
complexity is at most 2l(k − l)n. Since l ≤ log2 n, 2l(k − l)n < kn2. Since there are
dlog2 ne levels, the overall time complexity is upper-bounded by O(kn2 log n).
2.3.4 Optimization for packet distribution
In the proposed algorithms, we assume that, for a packet query, leaf nodes (atomic
predicates) have equal probability to be visited. Therefore minimizing the average
depth of leaf nodes maximizes the query throughput. However, practical network flows
may not be distributed uniformly with respect to the set of atomic predicates. For
example, if many queried packets may eventually visit a leaf in a very deep position
and leaves close to the root are rarely visited, the throughput decreases. To improve the
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query throughput for uneven packet distribution, we assign weights to atomic predicates
such that leaf nodes that are visited frequently will be placed relatively close to the root.
To estimate the packet distribution, AP Classifier maintains a counter for each leaf
node (atomic predicate), which records the number of visits by queries in a past period
of time. The value of a counter is then converted to the weight of the corresponding
atomic predicate after reduction of a fraction. When using the optimized algorithm pre-
sented in Section 2.3.3, every occurrence of |R(pi)| is replaced by the sum of weights
of all atomic predicates in R(pi), rather than its cardinality.
For example, suppose AP Classifier is choosing the root of a subtree by comparing
two predicates pi and pj whose relationship is as shown in Figure 2.6(c). If the atomic
predicates in setR(pj) have been queried by many packets, we prefer to place pj before
pi in order to get smaller depths for the leaf nodes labeled by the atomic predicates in
R(pj). Higher weights help to get H(Q,S, pj) < H(Q,S, pi) and make pj superior to
pi.
2.3.5 Dealing with packet header changes.
Today’s networks rely on a wide range of middleboxes (e.g., firewalls, intrusion
detection and prevention systems, and proxies) which achieve performance and se-
curity benefits. Some middleboxes may modify packet headers of incoming traffic.
When middleboxes modify packet headers, the forwarding behaviors of these pack-
ets on downstream boxes must be determined by the new header fields. For example,
when a Network Address Translation (NAT) middlebox translates an external address
to an internal one, AP Classifier must be aware of such translation and compute the
remaining packet behaviors using the internal address.
We consider three types of packet header changes by middleboxes, namely 1) de-
terministic based on packet headers, 2) deterministic based on packet payload, and 3)
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probabilistic.
For Type 1 changes, a change is completely determined by the header of an incom-
ing packet. In AP Classifier, we model these middlebox operations as a flow table. Each
packet that enters a middlebox passes through a flow table. A flow table contains entries
consisting of three components: match fields, instructions, and a new atomic predicate.
Match Fields are used to select packets that match the predicates in the fields. Instruc-
tions specify new packet headers if a match occurs. The atomic predicate fields store
atomic predicates calculated for new packet headers.
For Type 1 changes, given the packet header before a change, the atomic predicate
after the change can be easily determined based on the flow table. Therefore when
AP Classifier finds that a packet passes a middlebox, at the behavior computing stage
(second stage of AP Classifier), it checks the flow table whether the packet header has
been modified based on the middlebox policies. If the packet has a new header, AP
Classifier will read a new atomic predicate and compute forwarding behaviors for the
new header based on the new atomic predicate. Such process may repeat multiple times
until the packet is dropped or the forwarding path ends at the packet’s destination.
To see how this works, we use an extensional version of the example from 2.2.2 in
Fig. 2.7. The topology in the figure is a part of the whole network. Packets passing box
b1 are firstly processed by the flow table at middleboxMB1 and then by b1’s forwarding
table. The flow table of MB1 contains three entries that modify packet headers and one
default entry. Consider a packet enters box b1 and matches the third entry of the flow
table at MB1. Its corresponding packet header fields are changed to 172.16.146.2 and
its atomic predicate is changed to a4. The yellow line, in Fig. 2.7, shows that the packet
is forwarded to box b2 and then host h1 after header modification.
For Type 2 changes, the packet header after a change can be determined only after
the packet payload is known. Hence it is not possible to pre-compute a flow table that
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Forwarding path of a packet matched 
by the third entry of MB1 at b1
Match fields Instructions New atomic predicates
10.10.50.0/24 172.16.178.230 𝑎2 = 𝑝1 ∧¬𝑝2 ∧¬𝑝3
10.10.60.0/24 172.16.158.49 𝑎3 = ¬𝑝1 ∧𝑝2 ∧¬𝑝3
10.10.70.0/24 172.16.146.2 𝑎4 = ¬𝑝1 ∧𝑝2 ∧𝑝3
Others None Unchanged 
p1
p2
p3
b1
b2
h1
h2
MB1
The flow table at MB1
Figure 2.7: Computing forwarding path with header modifications
stores the atomic predicate after packet header changes. AP Classifier needs to search
the AP Tree again using the new header to find a new atomic predicate. This process
may repeat multiple times. Probabilistic changes (Type 3) can be treated similarly.
However, AP Classifier may output multiple possible network-wide behaviors for a
given packet.
2.4 AP Tree update and reconstruction
An important requirement of practical packet behavior identification is to support
dynamic network changes, including link and rule changes, both of which require ad-
dition and deletion of predicates. We design fast AP Tree update methods for adding a
predicate and deleting a predicate while maintaining tree correctness. However, after a
large number of updates, an AP Tree will experience performance degradation. Hence
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we also design an AP Tree reconstruction method that periodically rebuilds the tree to
optimize its performance while performing packet query processing at the same time.
In this section, we assume that each atomic predicate is equally weighted.
2.4.1 Real-time update of an AP Tree
The SDN data plane of a network is frequently updated by rule installation and
deletion. When a rule is inserted into or removed from a forwarding table or an ACL,
it may change one or more predicates. The set of atomic predicates may change as
well. We use the method presented in [117] to convert a rule insertion or deletion to
predicate change. If there is no predicate change after a rule update, AP Classifier
does not need to update the AP Tree. Otherwise, AP Classifier performs the methods
presented below to remove the old predicate and add the updated predicate in the AP
Tree. These methods are also used after addition/deletion of a network link which
requires addition/deletion of predicates.
Add a predicate. When a new predicate p is added, for each leaf node representing
an atomic predicate a in the current AP Tree, AP Classifier computes a∧ p and a∧¬p.
If none of them is false, two children are added to the leaf node, representing a∧ p and
a ∧ ¬p respectively. If one and only one of the two conjunctions is false, the label of
the leaf node is replaced by the other conjunction. If both conjunctions are false, AP
Classifier does nothing to this leaf node.
Delete a predicate. To delete an existing predicate p from the AP Tree, AP Classi-
fier does not remove all internal nodes labeled by p. This is because after the removal
of a node, merging the two sub-trees rooted at its children is very difficult. Instead,
we still keep p in the AP Tree, but mark it as “deleted” in the list of all predicates.
A query packet is still processed by the AP Tree to find its leaf node representing its
atomic predicate. It is still evaluated by the deleted predicates to determine which sub-
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Figure 2.8: Real-time update and query processing
tree to visit next. However, in the second stage of AP Classifier, i.e., computing packet
behaviors, AP Classifier just ignores all predicates that have been deleted.
2.4.2 Parallel reconstruction of an AP Tree
Although, the AP Tree updates in AP Classifier are fast and maintain correctness
of packet behavior identification, the AP Tree is no longer optimized and the query
throughput will degrade over time. Hence AP Classifier also reconstructs the AP Tree
to optimize it from time to time. To enable query processing at the same time as tree re-
construction, AP Classifier runs two processes in parallel, called the query process and
reconstruction process, executing on two different cores. The start of a reconstruction
is triggered by an event, e.g., query throughput is lower than a threshold or the number
of updates on the current AP Tree is higher than a threshold. During reconstruction, the
query process still maintains the old AP Tree by performing updates, and responds to
queries. After the reconstruction process has built a new tree, the new tree needs to be
updated for data plane changes that have occurred during the reconstruction period, if
any. The updated new tree is then transmitted to the query process to replace the old
tree.
Fig. 3.7 shows an example of the parallel reconstruction of an AP Tree. The query
process performs AP Tree search to respond to queries as well as updates when data
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Table 2.1: Statistics of the two real networks
Stanford Internet2
No. of rules
Forwarding ACL Forwarding
757170 1584 126017
No. of predicates 507 71 161
No. of atomic predicates 494 21 216
plane changes happen. In this example, the first reconstruction starts shortly after the
change that requires update 1, which is included in the construction of a new tree.
However, when the new tree is finished, two changes that require updates 2 and 3 have
occurred during the reconstruction period. The new tree does not reflect these two
updates. Thus the reconstruction process also applies these two updates to the new
tree. Then the updated new tree is sent to the query process to replace the old AP Tree.
Similarly the second reconstruction begins after changes that require updates 4, 5, and
6. The new tree constructed needs to be updated for changes (that require updates 7
and 8) which occur during the reconstruction period, before it can be sent to the query
process. Note that if there is no data plane change during a reconstruction period, the
new AP Tree is optimized.
If network dynamics change weights of atomic predicates, current AP Tree con-
structed using previous configurations should be rearranged to provide the best perfor-
mance. It is hard to adjust AP Tree in the real time update process which should be
finished very quickly. However, rearranging AP Tree needs to compare relationships of
several predicates which may cost beyond the time scale of milliseconds. To regain the
optimized performance of AP Tree, AP Classifier reconstructs AP Tree with the new
weights of atomic predicates periodically.
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2.5 Experimental Evaluation
We have implemented and evaluated AP Classifier on a general purpose desktop
computer with quadcore@3.2G and 16GB memory. Our implementation and evalua-
tion include all functional components for packet behavior identification from scratch,
including computing atomic predicates, classifying packets using the AP Tree, and
computing packet behaviors. (In comparison, prior work on this problem only im-
plements and evaluates a single function, namely: classifying packets to equivalence
classes [59].) For our experimental evaluation, we use forwarding tables and ACLs
from two real networks: Internet2 [14] and Stanford network [63]. As shown in Ta-
ble 2.1, Internet2 includes 126,017 forwarding rules and the Stanford network includes
757,170 forwarding rules and 1,584 ACL rules. The predicates and atomic predicates
are computed using the method in [118]. We compare AP Classifier with possible so-
lutions by utilizing two state-of-art tools, namely Header Space Analysis (HSA) [63]
and AP Verifier [118]. We do not compare AP Classifier with MDD [59] because it
relies on a special method for MDD construction and the source code is not publicly
available. Furthermore, its method does not support dynamic updates.
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Figure 2.10: Cumulative distribution of the depths of leaf nodes in AP Trees
2.5.1 Depths of leaf nodes
In this set of experiments, we show the depths of leaf nodes in an AP Tree, which
can demonstrate effectiveness of the proposed tree construction algorithms. We eval-
uate and compare three methods, Best from Random, Quick-Ordering, and Optimized
AP Tree construction (OAPT), for both Internet2 and Stanford networks. The Best from
Random method generates a random order of predicates for placement on levels of an
AP tree and performs pruning. It constructs 100 AP trees and chooses the tree with the
minimal average depth of leaf nodes. Quick-Ordering is presented in Section 2.3.2 and
OAPT is presented in Section 2.3.3.
Fig. 2.9 shows the average depth of of leaf nodes in an AP tree. For Internet2, the
average depth of Best from Random is 16.0, worse than those of Quick-Ordering (13.0)
and OAPT (10.6). OAPT reduces the average depth by 34% compared to Best from
Random and 19% compared to Quick-Ordering. For the Stanford network, Best from
Random also has the highest average depth (39.0), followed by Quick-Ordering (24.2)
and OAPT (16.9). OAPT shows significant improvement: It reduces the average depth
by 57% compared to Best from Random and by 30% compared to Quick-Ordering.
Fig. 2.10 shows the cumulative distribution of depths of leaf nodes in an AP Tree.
For Internet2, the leaf depths of Quick-Ordering are clearly smaller than Best from
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Figure 2.11: Overall construction time cost of AP Classifier
Random. However for the Stanford network such improvement is not very significant.
OAPT has clearly smaller depths for all percentiles compared to the other two methods.
For Internet2 80% of the leaf nodes in the OAPT tree have a depth less than 11 and for
Stanford this number is 21. The maximum depths are 24 and 46 for Internet2 and
Stanford, respectively.
2.5.2 Memory Usage
After construction, AP Classifier only stores one copy of all predicates and atomic
predicates as BDDs and also, for each predicate, a set of integer identifiers of atomic
predicates. In the AP Tree a node only stores a pointer to the labeled predicate or
atomic predicate. Since pointers use very little memory, the memory costs of different
methods are very close. Hence we only show the memory cost of AP Classifier using
OAPT. In our implementation, we use JDD library [111] to construct BDDs and their
logical operations. Each node in a BDD has a fixed size. The memory consumption of
a BDD is determined by the number of nodes in the BDD. It is interesting to observe
that more rules in a network do not always mean more BDD nodes. When there exist
much more similarities among rules of a network, a BDD of the network is more likely
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to be simple with a smaller number of nodes. The memory cost for the network is prone
to be lower.
The total memory cost of AP Classifier for Internet2 is 4.79 MB and that for Stan-
ford is 2.15 MB. Although Internet2 has fewer predicates than Stanford, it requires
more memory because BDDs of the Internet2 predicates are more complex than those
of Stanford. Unlike the results of [59] that only show memory cost of the search struc-
ture, our memory costs account for all components for packet behavior identification,
including the network topology, predicates, atomic predicates, and AP Tree. We found
that AP Classifier uses very small memory and can be stored in cache.
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2.5.3 AP Tree construction time
Fig. 2.11 shows times to construct AP Trees using the three methods for the two
networks. Note that the time cost is the overall construction time that includes the times
for computing atomic predicates as well as for AP Tree construction. The Random
method costs the least time but it is only for one random construction. To find the
best AP Tree from a large number of random constructions takes substantially longer
time. Quick-Ordering and OAPT have similar time costs, 201.36 ms and 204.39 ms,
for Internet2. For the Stanford network, OAPT requires 342.77 ms for Stanford, a little
longer compared to Quick-Ordering (293.36 ms).
2.5.4 Query throughput for static networks
In this set of experiments, we measure the throughput of AP Classifier to process
packet queries, in number of queries per second (qps). Packet headers used for queries
in the experiments are generated randomly with respect to the atomic predicates. The
throughput results for static networks are shown in Fig. 3.8. For Internet2, AP Classifier
using OAPT can achieve 3.4 Mqps, higher than Best from Random by 102% and Quick-
Ordering by 52%. For Stanford network, AP Classifier using OAPT can achieve 1.8
Mqps, higher than Best from Random by 46% and Quick-Ordering by 34%. For both
networks, the throughput of AP Classifier is much higher than 1 Mqps, which is enough
to satisfy most application requirements in SDN.
For static networks, we can use the open-source tool Hassel-C [11] that implements
HSA [63] to perform packet behavior identification for a specific packet. By providing
the input port and a specific query packet, Hassel-C computes the reachability tree
of the query packet. (For a unicast packet, the reachability tree is a forward path to
the packet’s destination.) The query throughputs of using Hassel-C to perform packet
behavior identification are 6 Kqps and 4.7 Kqps for Internet2 and Stanford, respectively,
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which are about 1000 times slower than the query throughputs of AP Classifier. They
are also plotted in Fig. 3.8 but they are very small and barely visible. We also compare
AP Classifier with AP Verifier [118]. We first use AP Verifier to compute all atomic
predicates, and perform a linear search of all atomic predicates for the query packet
until the packet matches an atomic predicate. Results in Fig. 3.8 show that AP Verifier
is also much slower, though its throughput is improved a lot compared to Hassel-C.
In addition we use a method of Forwarding Simulation, i.e., determining the for-
warding behavior of the packet at a box, then checking the forwarding behavior on the
next-hop box, until the packet stops. At each box, a packet is checked using the pred-
icates at the box linearly until a match occurs. In our experiments using Forwarding
Simulation, the average number of predicates checked is 96.8 and 232 for Internet2 and
Stanford, respectively. The corresponding throughput is 0.2 Mqps and 0.16 Mqps as
shown in Fig. 3.8. In contrast, only 10.6 and 16.8 predicates are needed to be checked
on average using AP Classifier.
2.5.5 Dynamic Networks
In this set of experiments, we first construct the AP Tree using a number of predi-
cates and then keep adding new predicates. We measure the time cost to add each new
predicate and update the AP Tree. Fig. 2.13 (a) shows the cumulative distribution of
time cost for adding a predicate in the Internet2 network. The initial number of predi-
cates is set to 40, 80, and 120 for three different experiments. From the figure we find
that about 80% of the predicate additions are finished in 2 ms. It may take 5-6 ms in
worst cases. We do not observe obvious differences when the initial numbers of predi-
cates are different. Fig. 2.13 (b) shows the results of similar experiments for Stanford.
The initial number of predicates is set to 100, 250, and 400 for three different experi-
ments. Over 90% of the predicate additions are finished in 1 ms. Deleting a predicate
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Figure 2.14: Query throughput for dynamic networks. The number of updates per
second is 100 in (a) (b) and 200 in (c) (d)
does not require extra computation, hence there is no result for deletions.
Query throughput for dynamic networks. We also evaluate the throughput of
AP Classifier in practical environments where additions and deletions of rules and pred-
icates happen over time. At the beginning of each experiment, a number of predicates
are chosen randomly from the set of predicates of a network to construct the initial
AP Tree. Starting from time 0, the arrivals of change events requiring the addition or
deletion of predicates are modeled by a Poisson process. Each update operation can
be adding a new predicate or deleting an existing predicate. In all experiments, equal
numbers of additions and deletions are inserted to the event queue. A reconstruction is
triggered every 0.4 s. During every reconstruction, AP Classifier answers queries and
performs updates as explained in Section 2.4.2. We compare AP Classifier with two
possible methods, APLinear and PScan, APLinear utilizes AP Verifier [118] to com-
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Figure 2.15: Query throughput of AP Classifier for different packet distributions
pute atomic predicates and performs a linear search for the query packet until the packet
matches an atomic predicate. Note that BDDs of atomic predicates are more complex
than those of predicates. Hence APLinear is not efficient. PScan performs a scan on
all predicates using the query packet and decides whether the packet is filtered by the
predicate. Both methods can be used to identify packet behaviors.
Fig. 2.14 shows the throughputs of AP Classifier, APLinear, and PScan in dynamic
networks. The x-axis is time and the y-axis is throughput measured in Mqps. We con-
duct two sets of experiments whose update rates are 100 updates/s and 200 updates/s.
From all subfigures in Fig. 2.14, we find that AP Classifier is faster than the other two
methods by an order of magnitude. Note that starting from time 0, the throughput of
AP Classifier slowly decreases as an increasing number of updates make the AP Tree
less optimized. The first reconstruction starts at time 0.4 s and finishes at about 0.6 s in
Fig. 2.14(a) and (c), and 0.7s in Fig. 2.14(b) and (d). When a reconstruction finishes,
the throughput immediately goes back to a high value (4 Mqps in (a) and (c), and 2
Mqps in (b) and (d)). Furthermore, the throughput does not degrade in the long-term
view. Comparing results of the two different update rates, we find that the average
throughput of AP Classifier does not drop much even after the update rate is doubled.
Hence AP Classifier is fast and robust for practical dynamic networks.
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2.5.6 Impact of packet distribution
To evaluate the performance of AP Classifier under various packet distributions,
we generate new sets of test traces which are unevenly distributed with respect to the
atomic predicates. The number of packets corresponding to the atomic predicates are
chosen by sampling from a Pareto distribution. The probability density function for the
Pareto distribution can be expressed as:
fX(x) =

αxmα
xα+1 x ≥ xm
0 x < xm
(2.2)
Where xm is the minimum possible value ofX , and α is a positive parameter, which
is known as the tail index. In our experiments, we chose xm = 1, α = 1. About half of
atomic predicates have 1,000 packets, but some have more than 20,000 packets.
We generated 10 sets of traces for each network. If we still use the AP Trees con-
structed without the consideration of packet distributions (distribution-unaware), the
average depth of all queries is 10.65 for Internet2 and 16.2 for Stanford network. Then
we construct new distribution-aware AP Trees using the method described in Section
2.3.4. The average depth of all queries is reduced to 8.09 (Internet2) and 11.3 (Stan-
ford). The corresponding values of throughput are shown in Fig. 2.15. We can see
that, if AP Classifier measures the packet distribution and assigns different weights to
atomic predicates, the throughputs in all cases have notable improvements compared
to the distribution-unaware method. The average query throughput increases from 4.2
Mqps to 5.2 Mqps for Internet2 and from 2.4 Mqps to 3.2 Mqps for Stanford.
2.5.7 Dealing with packet header changes
In this set of experiments, we evaluate the throughput of computing packet behav-
iors when there exist middleboxes modifying packet headers. We use the topologies
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of Internet2 and Stanford networks. In each experiment, one to three of switches are
chosen as boxes connecting to middleboxes that may change packet headers. Due to
lack of available middlebox policy data, we create ten entries for each flow tables of
middleboxes. Match fields of flow tables are produced by dividing the packet header
space into ten disjointed sets. We obtain match fields by grouping all atomic predicates
into ten predicates. So every incoming packet can match an entry. When incoming
packets match these entries, AP Classifier computes the remaining forwarding behav-
iors of packets using new atomic predicates. However for some packets, the new packet
headers cannot be determined in advance. AP Classifier needs to search the AP Tree
for the second time to find an atomic predicate for the new header. The process of
computing packet behaviors ends until the packet is dropped or reaches the destination.
We measure the throughput of packet behavior computation under these circum-
stances. Packets used in the experiments are generated randomly with respect to atomic
predicates.
Table 2.2: Throughput with packet header changes
Throughput(Mpps)
No. of middleboxes One Two Three
Internet2 13 10.2 9.8
Stanford 10 8.6 7.4
(a) Deterministic ratio = 0.9.
Throughput(Mpps)
No. of middleboxes One Two Three
Internet2 11.2 9.8 8.5
Stanford 8.9 7.9 7
(b) Deterministic ratio = 0.5.
Throughput(Mpps)
No. of middleboxes One Two Three
Internet2 8.7 6.9 3.2
Stanford 7.1 4.9 2.1
(c) Deterministic ratio = 0.
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Table. 2.2 illustrates throughput of computing packet behaviors for Internet2 and
Stanford datasets in different scenarios. We define the deterministic ratio as the por-
tion of middlebox rules that can determine the atomic predicates of packets after packet
header changes. When the deterministic ratio is 0.9, the throughput does not downgrade
much as number of middleboxes increases since most packets have new atomic pred-
icates stored in the flow tables, as shown in Table. 2.2 (a). Compared with Table. 2.2
(a), the corresponding throughput values in Table. 2.2 (b) and (c) are lower since more
packets passing through a middlebox require searching the AP Tree for a second time.
In the worst case, the throughput of computing packet behaviors is still 3.2 M and 2.1
M packets per second respectively, which is much higher than using other methods.
2.6 Related Work
Network-wide packet behavior identification is equivalent to reachability compu-
tation for a specific packet. This problem is related to, but different from, network
reachability analysis which has been studied for over a decade. Xie et al. [115] present
a model for static reachability analysis of data plane network state. Quarnet [64] rep-
resents ACLs as firewall decision diagrams to compute network reachability. Header
Space Analysis (HSA) [63] is custom-designed method to check network invariants but
not in real time.
For real-time applications, NetPlumber [62] makes use of HSA to detect network
invariant violations. Veriflow [65] stores all data plane rules in a multi-dimensional
prefix tree (trie) and determines the Equivalence Classes (ECs) of packets. An EC
is defined to be a set of packets that have identical forwarding actions in all boxes.
Veriflow then checks network invariants by analyzing reachability graphs of ECs.
Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) [42] is an efficient structure that were used to
model network properties. ConfigChecker [32] is general verification tool based on
45
symbolic model checking. It uses a BDD to represent a set of state transitions (also
flowchecker [31] by the same first author). If n header bits are used for filtering, each
BDD of ConfigChecker uses 2n state variables which is less efficient than BDDs used
in our design and [118] (In our design and AP Verifier, each BDD represents a set
of packets and requires the use of n bit variables only). Anteater [76] uses boolean
formulas to represent policies for packets traveling over edges in a network graph.
McGeer [80] models network verification as Boolean satisfiability problems. They
both use a SAT solver to check network properties. All of these general-purposes tools
are slow and operate on time scales of seconds to hours [65].
All of the above methods focus on analyzing network-wide invariants (e.g., reach-
ability, loop-freedom) but were not designed to identify the reachability of a specific
packet. For example, they can determine whether it is possible to reach box B from
box A but cannot tell whether a given packet can reach B. AP Verifier [118] can check
whether all packets entering a port in the network pass through a waypoint (e.g., a
firewall) but cannot tell whether a specific packet traverses a given waypoint.
One possible solution to packet behavior identification problem is checking the
packet against the set of atomic predicates calculated by AP Verifier linearly [118]
which is impractically slow. Another solution is to obtain all related data plane rules
of the packet by searching the trie created in Veriflow and then compute the forward-
ing path based on the rules. However storing all rules requires non-trivial memory
cost (tens of GBs for the Stanford network) which could cause disk I/Os during query
processing. As a result, using the Veriflow trie for packet behavior identification was
shown to be very slow by Inoue et al. [59] who proposed a tool that can quickly clas-
sify a packet to an EC. Its main drawback is that their MDD structure cannot correctly
represent the current network state because its does not support real-time updates, espe-
cially for SDNs where data plane updates are frequent [70]. Prefix DAG [99] employs
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a data structure similar to MDDs, but it focused on a simple classification problem with
a single header field.
Recently, Network Optimized Datalog is proposed as a general specification lan-
guage to model high-level abstraction of network beliefs and dynamism [75]. A new
approach to derive data plane from network configurations is in [49].
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Chapter 3
SICS: Secure and Dynamic Middlebox
Outsourcing
3.1 Overview
In modern networks, most middleboxes choose the appropriate processing actions
based on headers of incoming packets. When a middlebox processes a packet, it finds
a rule that matches the packet header and follows the action of the rule. Hence, rule
information specifies the packet processing policies of the middleboxes. Both packet
headers and rules contain private information belonging to the enterprise network. To
facilitate middlebox outsourcing without compromising privacy, we design and imple-
ment SICS, a Secure In-Cloud Service function chaining framework.
3.1.1 The SICS Outsourcing Architecture
As shown in Fig. 3.1, SICS contains three parties: an enterprise (middlebox user),
middlebox providers, and a third party cloud that holds in-cloud middlebox processing.
The middlebox providers set up middleboxes per request. The enterprise configures
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Figure 3.1: The architecture of SICS
and updates rules in these middleboxes. The enterprise has a gateway that connects the
internal and the external network. All incoming packets to the enterprise will be for-
warded to the gateway. The gateway encrypts the packet headers and payload and sends
the packets to the cloud for middlebox processing. The encryption can use symmetric-
key algorithms, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), which can be per-
formed in near line speed for 10Gbps links [71]. The encryption key is only known by
the enterprise. The in-cloud middleboxes process packets following the service func-
tion chains and then the cloud transmits the packets back to the enterprise. The gateway
decrypts the packets and sends them to the internal network.
The key challenge in this architecture is how the in-cloud middleboxes correctly
match packets to rules given that the packet headers are encrypted. To enable correct
rule-matching, SICS assigns each packet a label. The label represents all behavior of
the packet in the cloud, including to which middleboxes the packet should be forwarded
and in which order, as well as which rules the packet should match at a middlebox.
The operations on outgoing packets from the enterprise to an external site are sim-
ilar: before being transmitted over the Internet, outgoing packets are encrypted at a
gateway, redirected to the cloud, and sent back to the gateway.
Note the SICS gateway does not encrypt the checksum or TTL and instead adds a
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new checksum based on ciphertexts. Middleboxes can recompute checksums as usual.
An optimization that saves on bandwidth and latency can be adopted when commu-
nications are between two networks belonging to a same enterprise or two enterprises
that have established a secure channel. After in-cloud processing, the traffic can di-
rectly go to the destination site without sending back since the same encryption key is
shared by the two networks.
3.1.2 Security Model
In our security model, we assume the cloud and middlebox providers to be “honest
but curious” [56]. They are honest to perform their services correctly. However, they
might be curious to learn the user-configured processing policies at middleboxes or
peek at the traffic received. This security model is practical and reflects the following
real situations. First, the cloud or middlebox providers will not interrupt the normal
cloud services because such an interruption will be detected [48] [121]. However, it is
possible that the customer data might be gathered and sold by disgruntled employees [6]
[22]. Additionally, hackers may try to steal the customer traffic and policy data [7]. [1].
SICS aims to protect the enterprise network privacy from all these attacks. We do not
consider “active” attackers which manipulate costumers’ traffic maliciously.
SICS provides two security properties of middlebox outsourcing: (1) For an en-
crypted packet, the cloud and middlebox providers should not be able to infer its packet
headers based on its in-cloud behavior. (2) The cloud and middlebox providers should
not be able to learn the plaintext of header spaces specified by the enterprise’s process-
ing rules.
In SICS, label assignment of packet headers does NOT need to be collision-resistant.
Distinct packets can be assigned with the same label if they have identical behavior in
the cloud. Distinct flows can still be differentiated based on their encrypted header
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fields if needed.
3.1.3 Middlebox with Label Matching
Label matching (known as label switching in layer 3 routing) is a technique of net-
work relaying that is much faster than traditional IP-header switching. Each packet is
assigned a label and the switching takes place after examination of the label assigned
to each packet. SICS applies label matching to middlebox outsourcing which provides
two promising advantages: it can simultaneously achieve privacy protection and effi-
cient packet processing.
Privacy protection of packet headers and rules. We name the service function
chain and middlebox rule matching behavior of a packet as its cloud-wide behavior.
A set of packets that have the same cloud-wide behavior form an policy equivalence
class. In SICS, we assign the same label to all packets belonging to the same policy
equivalence class, even if their packet headers are different. Given an encrypted packet
with a label, SICS prevents an attacker from obtaining its original packet header. For
example, h specifies a set of packet headers, and packets whose headers fall in h share
the same cloud-wide behaviors. At the gateway, a packet is assigned a label (A label is
represented as a binary string, e.g, “10110110”, whose value has no relationship to the
packet header) if its header belongs to h. The length of a label is determined by the total
number of policy equivalence class. A label only includes two types of information: 1)
which middlebox the packet should visit in the cloud, and 2) which action a middlebox
should apply to this packet. The rule tables at the in-cloud middleboxes consist of
label-matching entries as opposed to header-matching entries. In this way, neither the
cloud nor middlebox providers can learn the original middlebox processing policies
with respect to the packet headers.
Note that label-matching does not protect packet behavior, such as forwarding and
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middlebox actions. These are known to the cloud no matter what type of protection is
used.
Efficient table lookup. Label matching can achieve better performance compared
to the traditional header based matching (e.g., IPv4 header), especially in software
middlexboxes running on general-purpose servers: (1) A label corresponds to a pol-
icy equivalence class and may cover multiple header ranges, the number of entries in a
label matching table could be much smaller than that in a header matching table. In our
experiment, a rule set with approximately 100K header matching rules of a function
network is converted to less than 250 labels. (2) With a properly designed hash table,
label matching can achieve O(1) lookup time, without the use of specialized hardware
such as TCAM. 3) Label matching adds little per-packet bandwidth overhead. In our
experiments, a 16-bit long label is sufficient to represent cloud-wide behavior in a net-
work with nearly one million rules. The label can be placed in the options field in IPv4
protocol header.
While the use of label matching is not new in a general networking, our specific
contributions lie in the design of header space mapping in the context of secure mid-
dlebox outsourcing.
3.1.4 Design Framework
Fig. 3.2 shows the system model of SICS. Those modules run on a controller in
the enterprise network. At runtime, the enterprise network administrator decides mid-
dlebox processing rules and the service function chaining requirements based on the
business objective of the enterprise. The rule preprocessing module takes these rules
and specifications as input and converts them into label-based rules. A SICS gateway is
constructed which assigns labels to packets based on the header space mapping relation-
ship. To simplify in-cloud deployment, the controller then creates an abstract function
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Figure 3.2: The system model of SICS
network which includes configurations for all middleboxes and an abstract switch that
is connected to all middleboxes. For each middlebox, there is a rule table identifying
the action applied to each packet based on the label. The abstract switch is equipped
with a forwarding table. Besides label and output port entry, the forwarding table has
an extra entry classifying packets based on their input ports. The input ports are used
to identify the segment in the service function chain that the packet is currently in. The
abstract switch determines the next hop of a packet based on its label and input port.
The abstract function network can be easily mapped to the configurations of a prac-
tical deployment in the cloud that ensures packets are processed by required middle-
boxes in a specified sequence. Configurations are sent to the cloud from the enterprise
using a VPN tunnel. When there exist processing policy or rule changes, this procedure
is called repeatedly to update both the enterprise gateway and the middleboxes running
in the cloud.
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3.2 Enterprise Modules of SICS
To enable secure middlebox outsourcing, SICS dynamically maps the header spaces
specified by the middlebox processing policies to labels at the enterprise gateway. To
keep the complexity low and maintain scalability, the gateway performs only inexpen-
sive per-packet operations, which are parallelizable. In this section, we present the
design of three key modules at the SICS enterprise side.
3.2.1 Rule Composition
The rule composition module takes the service function chain requirements and the
middlebox processing rules as its input and implement its functionality in two steps.
It first combines different service function chain requirements and determines the
overall service function chains for each set of packets. A service function chain requires
that a class of packets must be processed by a number of middleboxes in a designated
sequence. For example, all HTTP packets should go through IDS → Proxy. Packets
from an internal site should be processed by NAT→ Firewall. A service function chain
is formulated with respect to a set of packets, specified by their packet headers, repre-
sented as a predicate P . P specifies the set of packets X for which P (x) is true for
a packet x ∈ X . A packet may relate to multiple service function chain requirements
and needs to be processed by all the middleboxes included in those chains. Consider
m service function chain requirements: (Pi, ci, ri), for i = 1, ...,m. For the i-th re-
quirement, let Pi be the predicate specifying the set of packets, ci be the sequence of
middleboxes, and ri be the priority which is provided by administrators to determine
the order of middlebox processing when two chains are combined. Requirements are
listed in descending order of priorities. To ensure that packets are processed by all re-
quired middleboxes, SICS uses Algorithm 1 to calculate a set of middlebox chaining
equivalence class, each of which specifies a set of packets with an identical service
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Algorithm 1: Compute equivalence classes for middlebox chaining require-
ments.
Input : Predicates of service function chain requirements (Pi for
i = 1, ...,m).
Output: A list of predicates F = {f1, f2, ...fn}.
1 T1 = ∅, T2 = ∅, T1.add(P1), T1.add(¬P1)
2 for i = 2 to m do
3 for each f ∈ T1 do
4 if f ∧ Pi 6= false then
5 T2.add(f ∧ Pi)
6 end
7 if f ∧ ¬Pi 6=false then
8 T2.add(f ∧ ¬Pi)
9 end
10 end
11 T1 = T2, T2 = ∅
12 end
13 F = T1
14 Return F
chain.
The output of Algorithm 1 is a list of predicateF = {f1, f2, ...fn}. The conjunction
of any two predicates in F is false (referring to an empty set). Therefore packet sets
specified by any two predicates have no intersection. Each predicate fi corresponds
to a service function chain, which can be obtained by concatenating ci of Pi, if the
conjunction of fi and Pi is not false. The order is determined by their corresponding
priorities.
Based on the composed service chain requirements, the rule composition module
generates the forwarding table at the abstract switch to steer traffic along the required
middleboxes in a sequence. Based on the input port field, we can partition the forward-
ing table into sub-tables. In each sub-table, we calculate one predicate for each output
port by combining corresponding packet header prefixes or ranges. In our implemen-
tation, by representing packet sets as predicates, the merge operation can be performed
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efficiently using graph-based algorithms with Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [42].
With predicate compositions, there exists at most one predicate per output port in each
sub-table. We use the example shown in Fig. 3.3 to illustrate this process. Fig. 3.3(a) is
an abstract function network with three middleboxes. All middleboxes are connected
by an abstract switch with five ports. Port b,c and d are used to link the middleboxes
and port a and e are ingress and egress ports. Fig. 3.3(b) shows three sample service
function chains. The set of packets in each chain is specified by an integer range. 1
Fig. 3.3(c) is the original forwarding table at the virtual switch that steers traffic across
the middleboxes according to the service chains in Fig. 3.3(b). From Fig. 3.3(c), we see
that many items in each sub-table share the same output port. This allows us to reduce
the size of each table by merging ranges which have the same output port. The resulting
forwarding table is shown in Fig. 3.3(d). We reduce the total items in the forwarding
table from 14 to 9.
The second step of the rule composition module is combining user-configured mid-
dleboxes processing rules which are created locally either by the network administrator
or middlebox providers. We define the middlebox rules with the 3-tuple: (Pi, bi, ri),
where Pi denotes the predicate from the i-th rule, bi is the action performed on packets
matching this rule and ri is the priority. We sort all rules at a middlebox in descend-
ing order with respect to priorities. When a packet is checked against the rules at a
middlebox, it is matched by the first rule whose predicate evaluates to true. We use Al-
gorithm 2 to convert the rules of a middlebox to a list of predicates F = {f1, f2, ...fn},
each of which specifies the packets sharing the same behavior at the middlebox, where
n is the total number of distinct behavior. For example, a firewall may have a predi-
cate specifying packets allowed by the ACLs and another predicate specifying the ones
denied.
1In our implementation, all packet sets are converted to predicates and represented by binary decision
diagrams (BDDs) [42]. Here we use integer ranges for simplicity.
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Algorithm 2: Compute a predicate for each action.
Input : Sorted processing rules at a middlebox (Pi for i = 1, ...,m)
Output: A list of predicates F = {f1, f2, ...fn}
1 for j = 1 to n do
2 fj ← false
3 end
4 valid← false
5 for i = 1 to m do
6 if Pi shares the same action as fj then
7 fj ← fj ∨ (Pi ∧ ¬valid)
8 valid← valid ∨ Pi
9 end
10 end
11 Return F
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Figure 3.4: Header space divided by predicates
3.2.2 Header Space Mapping
After rule composition is performed, we obtain a list of predicates for each mid-
dlebox and the abstract switch. Predicates from a box can be seen as a partition which
divides the packet header space into several disjoint sub-spaces, each with the same
action. If we place predicates from all of the boxes together, the partition of the header
space will become combinatorically finer due to the intersection of predicates from
different boxes.
Fig. 3.4 shows an example illustrating the process of placing predicates from two
boxes into a single header space. Each predicate is associated with two header fields2.
2In practice, a predicate may be defined over multiple fields, e.g., 5-tuple in TCP/IP packets. Here,
we use two dimension headers as an example.
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Five predicates P1 ∼ P5 from the two boxes are placed together in one packet header
space. Then, the header space is partitioned into 15 blocks. Each block represents a
set of headers belonging to the same set of predicates. The packet headers within one
block will match the same set of predicates and exhibit identical behavior at all boxes.
Therefore, they have the same cloud-wide behavior and hence belong to the same policy
equivalence class. Note that a policy equivalence class is not necessarily a single block.
Blocks that are specified by the same set of predicates belong to the same equivalence
class. As shown in Fig. 3.4, the original predicate P1 is divided into three segments.
The right and left segments are only covered by P1 and form an equivalence class a1.
The segment in the middle is covered by both P1 and P5 and forms an equivalence
class a4. In total, the partition of 15 blocks forms 6 equivalence classes represented by
a1 ∼ a6.
To obtain the policy equivalence classes, SICS reuses Algorithm 1 given a list of
predicates. At this time, the input is the set of predicates from all middleboxes and the
abstract switch. The set of policy equivalence classes has two key properties: (1) Pack-
ets within the same class have identical cloud-wide behavior. That is, these packets will
traverse the same sequence of middleboxes and have same behaviors at each middlebox
in the network. (2) Each input predicate is equal to the disjunction of a subset of policy
equivalence classes, shown in Fig. 3.4 where P1 = a1 ∨ a4 and P5 = a3 ∨ a4 ∨ a5.
SICS maps packet headers within an policy equivalence class to one label. In the
rule tables of the in-cloud boxes, predicate P is represented as a set of labels, which
are determined by the subset of policy equivalence classes whose disjunction is P .
3.2.3 Example
We show an example abstract function network configured with labels in Fig. 3.5.
The abstract switch is divided into four separate switch instances with each connecting
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to a single middlebox. We have two flows h1 and h2. Flow h1 is required to go through
a firewall, a NAT and a load balancer, while flow h2 should go through a proxy. For
simplicity, we assume the sets of predicates for all middleboxes and switches in Fig. 3.5
have a similar partition of the packet header space as in Fig. 3.4. For example, switch
S1 has two predicates that specify the same partition as P4 and P5. P5 specifies the
set of packets that are forwarded to the firewall and other packets specified by P4 are
forwarded to S3. The NAT has three predicates which specify the same partition as
P1 ∼ P3. Packets matching P1 are translated to packets specified by P2. P3 represents
a default drop predicate. The set of policy equivalence classes are still a1 ∼ a6 as in
Fig. 3.4. h1 and h2 belong to the packet sets specified by a4 and a1, respectively. Rel-
evant entries for the two flows are shown in the label-matching tables of middleboxes.
The two forwarding tables are for switch S1 and S4. From the figure, we can see packets
in h1 (red arrows) will be forwarded to and allowed by the firewall. After that, the label
is changed to a5 and then a2 by the NAT and the load balancer sequentially based on
label replacement actions. Details on label replacement are presented in §3.3.2. Finally
the packets are forwarded to the egress by S4 with the label a2. Similarly, packets in
h2 (greed dotted arrows) are processed by the proxy before they are sent back to the
gateway. Note the input port field at a switch is necessary when incoming and outgoing
packets share the same label.
3.2.4 Packet Classification
To assign labels to packets, the gateway determines to which policy equivalence
class a given packet belongs. Policy equivalence classes can be represented as the
conjunction of input predicates. An intuitive approach is to test the packet against these
predicates linearly. However, this approach is obliviously too slow.
SICS uses all predicates obtained from the rule composition module to build a
60
S1
S3
S2
S4
FW
NAT
LB
Proxy
Input Label Action
In a4 FW
FW a4 S2
- a1 S3
Label Action
a4 Allow
Label Action
a4 a4 → a5
Label Action
a5 a5 → a2
Input Label Action
- a5 LB
- a2 Out
Label Action
a1 a1 → a2
Figure 3.5: An example Abstract Function Network
packet classifier, using the algorithms in [112]. The proposed classifier includes a bi-
nary tree whose root has a predicate p1. At level i, the 2i internal nodes each has a
predicate pi. Starting from the root, at each internal node, the input packet header is
evaluated by the predicate of the node. If the result is true, the packet continues to be
evaluated in the left sub-tree. Otherwise, it goes to the right sub-tree. A leaf node rep-
resents an policy equivalence class and the set of packets that can reach this leaf belong
to the policy equivalence class. In practice, for a tree constructed by k predicates, its
height is considerably lower than k and the number of leaves is significantly smaller
than 2k. The reason behind this observation is that conjunctions of a large number of
predicates are are false and specify empty sets of packets, no new node will be created.
More importantly, using the methods in [112], the classifier supports incremental up-
dates when there exist policy changes. For example, new predicates can be added at the
bottom of the tree with little overhead.
The gateway classifies packets into one of the policy equivalence classes, with each
has a unique cloud-wide behavior. This corresponds to the provable coarsest refinement
of packet header space and thus can be used to provide best computation time and space
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performance of the gateway.
3.3 In-Cloud Modules of SICS
SICS supports the core functionality of a wide range of middleboxes. For those
middleboxes that examine packet headers (e.g., firewall, NAT, L3/L4 load balancer),
SICS can be directly applied using the label-matching method. For middleboxes that
also check payload (e.g., web proxy, IDSes), SICS can be combined with recent works
of secure DPI [104, 122].
Note that for very simple middleboxes, such as a stateless firewall blocking certain
IPs, the gateway can fulfill its task when computing the label, packets that only traverse
these middleboxes are processed locally and do not need to be redirected to the middle-
boxes running in the cloud. However, we observe many middleboxes involve expensive
operations and for this reason enterprises tend to outsource them.
3.3.1 Stateful Middlebox
Unlike switches or routers, common middleboxes conduct stateful functionalities
(e.g., bidirectional firewall and address translation [89, 95] , stateful load balancing
[10,45]) and use advanced statistical techniques to detect and prevent potential security
threats (e.g., flood protection [20,50]). Packet behavior at middleboxes may depend on
the history of packets the middleboxes have observed. Such functions can be resource-
consuming since they need to maintain a separate state for every single connection.
For example, a stateful firewall will permit an inbound packet filtered by the ACLs if
it belongs to an established connection. Such functions reply on per-connection states,
in-cloud middleboxes should be able to recognize packets of the same connection based
on encrypted packet headers.
62
In SICS, all header fields are encrypted as a whole to provide high security guar-
antee and thus cannot be used to identify packets of the same connection. To support
per-connection states, SICS adds a 32-bit connection identifier to each packet based on
a pseudorandom function [55] , seeded in a given seed s:
Ic = prf s((IP src‖portsrc) ∗ (IP dst‖portdst))
Using the equation above, the inbound and outbound packets of the same connection
will have the same identifier. By conducting experiments using a real dataset [12],
we observe that the probability that two packets from different connections having the
same identifier is negligible. Note adding an identifier to recognize packets of the same
connection is a general approach that can be applied to other middlebox outsourcing
work, such as Embark [71] and Splitbox [33].
Algorithm 3: Compute equivalence classes after adding header transformers.
Input : A list of predicates P and a set of packet transformers T
Output: A list of predicates F = {f1, f2...fn}
1 F ← EC(P), P ← F
2 for T ∈ T and fi ∈ F that can be transformed by T do
3 P ← P ⋃T (fi)
4 end
5 F ← EC(P), P ← F
6 for each deterministic T ∈ T and fi ∈ F do
7 Compute the set B = {b1, b2, ...bl} ⊆ F whose disjunction is T (fi)
8 R← {T−1(bj)| for each bj ∈ B}
9 P ← P ⋃R
10 end
11 F ← EC(P)
12 Return F
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3.3.2 Header Transformer
In SICS, a single label is sufficient to guide all rule matching behavior of a packet
if it does not traverse middleboxes that modify packet headers. As shown in Fig. 3.5,
header transformers such as NAT, load balancer may modify packet headers. When a
packet goes through a header transformer, the behavior of the packet at downstream
boxes is determined by its new header. With label-matching, the subsequent packet be-
havior must be determined by the new label corresponding to the new header. Hence,
middleboxes must be able to assign new labels to packets they have just modified with-
out ever learning their headers.
To address the above problem, we design a label-to-label replacement scheme. A
packet transformer maps an input packet set to an output packet set. For a packet trans-
former T and a predicate P specifying its input packet set, T (P ) denotes the trans-
formed predicate specifying the output packet set. More specifically, given a predicate
P , T (P ) can be calculated by replacing constraints on corresponding header bits. For
example, a transformer for a four-bit prefix 11 ? ? modifies the second bit from 1 to 0.
This operation can be modeled by applying existential quantification and conjunction
of the new constraints to the second bit. The transformed predicate represents prefix
10 ? ?. Similarly, T−1 can be calculated using the inverse process. SICS supports both
deterministic (e.g., one to one mapping from a prefix to another) or non-deterministic
(e.g., randomly choose a new address from a given prefix) packet transformers.
Header transformers may produce new policy equivalence classes. Given a list of
predicates P , we extend Algorithm 1 to calculate the new set of policy equivalence
classes, denoted as EC(P), when header transformers exist. As shown in Algorithm 3,
a new set of policy equivalence classes is calculated after a set of transformed pred-
icates are added (line 5). For a transformer T , the transformed predicate T (fi) for a
policy equivalence class fi is equal to the disjunction of a subset of equivalence classes
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B = {b1, b2, ...bl}. If T is non-deterministic, a packet in the packet set specified by fi
is randomly transformed into a packet that belongs to either one of equivalence classes
within B. However, if T performs a one-to-one mapping, a transformed packet must
belong to a deterministic policy equivalence class. To decide into which equivalence
class a packet should be transformed, lines 6-11 of Algorithm 3 calculate the inverse
predicate for each bi ∈ B and update the set of equivalence classes. Then, each deter-
ministic transformer has a one-to-one mapping for all policy equivalence classes. With
the refined set of policy equivalence classes, SICS can easily build a label replacement
table for each header transformer. Upon receiving a packet with a label that can be
processed by the transformer, a non-deterministic header transformer randomly modi-
fies the label to one of the multiple labels, whereas a deterministic header transformer
always conducts a unique label replacement action. Example label replacement tables
are shown in Fig. 3.5 for a NAT and a load balancer.
In addition to replacing labels, the middlebox also assigns an index corresponding
to the modified header, e.g., an index for an IP in a prefix stored at the gateway. When
the gateway receives a packet with such an index, it restores the modified header fields.
To keep the connection identity, a header transformer maintains a mapping from the
newly assigned header/index to the original connection identifier. For reverse packets,
the gateway does not encrypt assigned header fields (e.g., random port number ranges
assigned by a NAT). Upon receiving packets with the same assigned header fields, the
transformer restores the connection identifier. So the same processing policy is applied
in subsequent middleboxes.
3.3.3 Case Studies
Next, we use a proxy and a Palo Alto firewall [20] as examples to discuss how SICS
combines the two techniques above to support more complex real-world middleboxes.
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Proxy. An HTTP proxy accepts a TCP connection from a client, extracts the URI,
and looks it up in its cache. This results in one of two cases: hit or miss. (a) Hit: The
proxy extracts the encrypted header of the packet and creates a new reply packet with
the header and the requested contents which it then sends to the client. The proxy also
adds a label to each reply packet which directs the packet for subsequent processing.
When the gateway receives the HTTP reply packet, it decrypts the packet header and
restores the source and destination addresses of the packet. (b) Miss. The proxy creates
a new HTTP connection and forwards the same encrypted request to the Web server.
The proxy also adds its own encrypted address and a label for further processing. When
the packet bounces back to the gateway, the gateway decrypts the packet header and
replaces the source address with the proxy’s address. In the reverse direction, reply
packets from the Web server are encrypted and received by the proxy. The proxy caches
the replied content and sends the content back, as in case (a). During this process,
packets are forwarded and processed by the proxy in the cloud without exposing the
headers.
Palo Alto firewall. Palo Alto firewall is a commercial network gateway which per-
forms firewall, NAT, and/or IDS functions organized in a chain. Here, we consider a
firewall-NAT chain that examines packets headers. The NAT function can be divided
into two categories: source NAT and destination NAT. A source NAT translates the
headers of connections initiated within internal networks, while a destination NAT ap-
plies to connections started from outside networks.
For a packet initiated within the inside network, the firewall first applies its label-
based ACLs and stores the connection identifier if the packet is allowed. Then, the
NAT adds an index for a reserved external IP, a random port number and assigns a
new label to the packet based on the label replacement table. Note header transformers
may break the connection identity between outbound and inbound packets. To make
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the connection reversible, the NAT maintains a mapping from the newly assigned port
number to the packet’s original encrypted headers as well as the connection identifier.
Before packets are sent out to external networks, the gateway decrypts and restores the
header fields assigned by the source NAT. For a reverse packet, if the destination port
belongs to the range of random port numbers assigned by the source NAT, the gateway
encrypts the packet and places the port number in the options field of the packet. Us-
ing the port number, the NAT restores reverse packets with the corresponding original
encrypted headers and the connection identifier. So the same processing policy is ap-
plied to reverse packets at the firewall. Packets initiated from outside networks have
similar processing schemes, except that a destination NAT maintains a deterministic
one-to-one mapping from a public address to a private address.
3.4 Update operations
Overload is a common cause of middlebox failures [54]. Traffic should be steered
across different middlbox instances dynamically. Service function chain requirements
and middlebox processing rules are also changing constantly to meet the new cos-
tumers’ needs or reduce security threats. All changes in traffic processing result in rule
updates at the enterprise and on the cloud sides. To keep the correctness and perfor-
mance of in-cloud processing, it is necessary for a middlebox outsourcing framework
to support incremental rule updates with low latencies. A rule insertion or deletion can
be converted to predicate changes [118]. If there are predicate changes after the rule
updates, SICS performs the following methods to update both the enterprise side and
the in-cloud boxes.
Update at the enterprise side. SICS starts by updating the packet classifier at the
gateway. When a new predicate is added, SICS adds the new predicate to the bottom
of the packet classifier. If the update produces new equivalence classes, the packet
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classifier starts to classify packets to the new set of equivalence classes. When exist-
ing predicates are deleted, SICS updates the set of equivalence classes by merging the
equivalence classes if they identify the same cloud-wide behavior. Updates to the clas-
sifier can be executed very fast. In our experiments, the average cost of adding/deleting
a predicate is less than 0.5 ms.
To figure out the update schemes of in-cloud boxes, the enterprise controller main-
tains a representation list for each predicate. This list includes all equivalence classes
whose disjunction is equal to the predicate. In the example shown in Fig. 3.4, the rep-
resentation list of P5 is {a3, a4, a5} and for P2 it is {a2, a5}. Representation lists of
predicates are maintained dynamically, so when the list of a predicate is modified, the
controller sends update instructions to the in-cloud box which produces the predicate.
Update in the Cloud. In SICS, a rule update in the cloud consists of the updating of
the rule tables (hash tables) at each middlebox and the abstract switch. The forwarding
table of the abstract switch is partitioned into several sub-tables which are updated
independently. When a new equivalence class is added into the representation list of
a predicate, its label-action pair is inserted into the rule table of the in-cloud box that
produced the predicate. Here, the key is the label which corresponds to the policy
equivalence class and the value is the action of the predicate. In contrast, a label-action
pair is removed from the rule table when the corresponding equivalence class is deleted
from the representation list of the predicate.
The connection states maintained in the stateful middleboxes will not be disrupted
during an update since states are identified by encrypted packet headers or connection
IDs.
Maintaining Processing Consistency. Rule updates need to be treated carefully.
Any inconsistency in state between the gateway and the boxes in the cloud may lead to
incorrect middlebox processing. To maintain per-packet consistency, the controller first
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calculates the incremental rule update schemes for the enterprise gateway and boxes
involved in the cloud. During this time, the gateway and in-cloud middleboxes continue
to encrypt and process traffic according to the old rules. Once the update schemes
are determined, the gateway buffers incoming packets until all in-cloud packets finish
processing in the cloud (The buffering time is bounded by the packet processing time,
which is typically hundreds of milliseconds [102]). Then, the gateway and in-cloud
boxes install updates and start processing new packets. To maintain flow consistency,
ongoing flows should continue traversing the original sequence of middleboxes while
they are updating. SICS employs the migration avoidance mechanism in [86]. New
flows are steered to new middlebox instances while existing flows are still processed by
old ones.
3.5 Security Analysis
SICS converts IP prefixes and other header spaces from middlebox processing rules
to a list of predicates. Each predicate is represented as a set of labels that are used
as matching fields to enable in-cloud functionalities. Labels do not leak size, order or
borders of header spaces specified in the rules. The cloud is unable to learn to which
field of the packet header a match corresponds. Labels at in-cloud middleboxes are
updated independently and the information about header spaces represented by these
labels cannot be inferred from updates. A gateway encrypts packet headers and assigns
a label to each packet in order to identify its in-cloud processing. In this case, given
an encrypted packet with a label, its original packet header cannot be reversed from
the label. For any two packets that are assigned the same label, the cloud is limited to
learning that the two packets have the same cloud-wide behavior, but prevented from
determining any other information about their orders or values.
Information leakage. From an information-theoretic point of view, information
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leakage of a communication system is at least log2N bits, where N is the number of
observable equivalence classes [77]. In the context of SICS, each equivalence class
identifies a cloud-wide behavior, which is represented by one label. The label instructs
the in-cloud boxes to process the packet as configured. With a less number of cloud-
wide behaviors, the cloud may not be able to correctly perform its functionalities. In
this sense, SICS achieves minimal information leakage. On the other hand, Embark
employs a field-by-field encoding to convey the information about how packets should
be processed in the cloud. The set of cloud-wide equivalence classes are the Carte-
sian product of per-field equivalence classes. Consequently, Embark exposes a larger
number of observable equivalence classes and hence more information leakage.
Next, we demonstrate that the security of SICS is stronger than the PrefixMatch in
Embark [71] under two attacks.
Chosen Plaintext Attack. A chosen plaintext attack allows an attacker to deter-
mine which plaintext message is encrypted into an input ciphertext message. We as-
sume that an attacker (e.g., the cloud itself or a hacker) selectively sends sample pack-
ets to the gateway and observes their cloud-wide behavior, attempting to figure out
the plaintext of the rules at a middlebox. PrefixMatch adopts a per-field encryption
scheme where prefixes or ranges for each header field are encrypted separately. For an
encrypted prefix or range, the attacker knows to which field of the packet header the
prefix or range corresponds. The plaintext of the encrypted prefix or range can then be
obtained by traversing the entire search space of that field.
An example of such attack is the following: for the destination port field in the IPv4
header, PrefixMatch encrypts a port number interval [s, e] to a random interval [S,E].
All port numbers falling in [s, e] are encrypted to values in [S,E]. Knowing the interval
[S,E], it takes an attacker at most 216 queries (e.g., sample packets with a destination
port traversing from 0 to 216) to find all port numbers in [s, e], where 16 is the length
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of the port field. Now the attacker has successfully deciphered the encrypted interval
[S,E] in the cloud. In addition, when a future packet matches the interval [S,E], the
attacker learns that the original destination port of the packet falls in [s, e]. Similarly,
the attacker could learn mapping relationships for other fields. Since a chosen packet
header can test each header field simultaneously, the number of required queries to
decipher all header fields is determined by the length of the longest header field. For a
5-tuple, the longest header field is 32 bits. So it takes at most 232 queries to decipher a
5-tuple based ruleset which is encrypted using PrefixMatch.
As described in §3.2.2, SICS encrypts packet header fields as a whole. This means
all packet header fields are involved in the header space mapping process, i.e., the label
of a packet is determined by all of the bits in its header. When considering the same
attack just described, we clearly see the benefit of SICS which require 2104 queries to
decipher, a significant improvement over PrefixMatch’s 232. PrefixMatch cannot be
modified to encrypt all fields as a whole since the encryption in PrefixMatch is based
on comparing per-field values of packets and the endpoints of rules.
Frequency Analysis Attack. Frequency analysis is a classic inference attack that
has been historically used to recover plaintexts from substitution-based ciphertexts, and
is known to be useful for breaking deterministic encryption. In frequency analysis, an
adversary acquires knowledge of the frequency distribution of plaintext messages (e.g.,
via unintended data release or data breaches), counts the frequency of ciphertext mes-
sages and maps each ciphertext to the plaintext in the same frequency rank. To conduct
frequency analysis, we assume the cloud is able to obtain the plaintext enterprise traffic
from a previous time period and tries to infer the current encrypted traffic using the pre-
vious frequency distribution. To prevent frequency analysis, SICS adds randomness to
the encryption of the original packet headers and the connection identifiers by changing
the seed for symmetric key generation and the pseudorandom function after a certain
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Figure 3.6: SICS software architecture
time period. In SICS, it is not useful to add randomness to the labels of packets. For
example, if a new label is assigned to a packet when the behavior of the packet does
not change, the cloud can easily determine the new label is equivalent to the old label
because they specify the same cloud-wide behavior. However, frequency analysis only
achieves low inference accuracy in SICS. One reason is that because a label in SICS
covers a range of packet headers, the cloud cannot infer the frequency of each single
packet header using the frequency of the label. Another reason is that the frequency
analysis is sensitive to label updates that occur during middlebox load balancing and
the changes in processing policy over time. An update to a label can change the fre-
quency rank of multiple labels, including the label itself as well as other labels with
similar frequencies. In contrast, PrefixMatch uses a one-to-one deterministic header
mapping which is less secure in terms of frequency analysis.
3.6 Implementation
We have built a SICS prototype in our laboratory using middleboxes running in the
Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) [2] and a gateway running on a general purpose
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desktop computer with quadore@3.2G and 6GB memory. The gateway redirects traffic
from another machine using the same model.
Fig. 3.6 shows the software architecture of SICS. The enterprise side consists of two
layers: a control layer and a tunnel layer. The control layer takes the service function
chain requirements and processing rules of the middleboxes as its input to calculate an
abstract function network. When there are changes, the control layer updates the packet
classifier in the tunnel layer and calculates the necessary updates in the cloud. Then, it
sends batched update instructions to the middlebox instances running in the cloud. The
tunnel layer, acting as a gateway, performs packet manipulation, header encryption and
VPN tunnels connecting remote instances in the cloud.
On the cloud side, the abstract function network can be easily converted into a
practical deployment within the Amazon VPC. SICS supports all header-related mid-
dleboxes. We implemented middleboxes using Click [68] and rule tables using the
Cuckoo hash table [46, 85]. To enable in-cloud middlebox chaining, SICS adds an
adapter layer which holds a sub-forwarding table from the abstract switch at each mid-
dlebox instance. Based on their labels, the adapter decapsulates incoming packets for
current processing and encapsulates outgoing packets with the address of the next mid-
dlebox.
A possible limitation of SICS is that SICS employs label matching which requires
modifications to the existing header matching based middlebox implementations. How-
ever, we believe this issue will be fully relieved with the emergence of new and promis-
ing modularized network function frameworks such as OpenBox [41].
3.7 Evaluation
We now investigate the performance of SICS at both the enterprise side and in-cloud
middleboxes.
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3.7.1 Enterprise-side performance
Gateway
We first evaluate the performance of the SICS gateway. For most experiments, we
use a synthetic workload generated by the Pktgen traffic generator powered by Intel’s
DPDK [21]. We create an abstract function network using Stanford dataset [12] with
three types of middleboxes: firewalls, source NATs and destination NATs. A destina-
tion NAT is used to implement a L4 load balancer. The Stanford dataset has 16 routers
(2 backbone routers connected to 14 zone routers) with 757170 IPv4 forwarding rules
and 1584 ACL rules. Firewalls can be placed on any router. For each firewall, we ran-
domly select ACLs from the ruleset and shuffle the order to achieve different security
policies. NATs are added to the dataset connecting zone routers to private subnets. For
each NAT added, we use a different public IP address for the newly created port of the
zone routers and a different private prefix for the subnet. A subset of forwarding rules
are used to steer traffic along middlebox chains. We vary the number of middleboxes
from 0 to 16 with the total number of rules increasing from 100K to 800K to show
how the performance of SICS is affected by the network size. We compare the SICS
gateway with PrefixMatch in Embark [71] since PrefixMatch is the only existing cryp-
tographic approach that supports service function chaining. We report the median of
10 iterations for each experiment.
Construction time. Table 3.1 shows the construction time of the gateway with
respect to the network size. For SICS, rule composition accounts for the most of the
overhead while computing equivalence classes and constructing the packet classifier
can be finished in tens of milliseconds. In Embark, the time cost is the time to construct
the data structure for PrefixMatch. The PrefixMatch structure in Embark works only
on one header field, so PrefixMatch needs to be run for every header field, one after
another. In Table 3.1, we see that the time cost of PrefixMatch in Embark is at least
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No. of
Rules (K)
Rule
Composition (s)
Computing
ECs (ms)
Packet
Classifier (ms)
Embark
(s)
100 0.3 14.9 53.4 7.2
200 1.1 15.2 83.2 12.6
400 2.9 22.4 129.0 18.8
600 7.1 25.2 148.2 50.3
800 9.4 30.5 249.8 76.43
Table 3.1: Construction time of the gateway.
5 times larger than SICS for all six network sizes. The reason is that the total number
of sub-intervals for each header field in PrefixMatch is much larger than the number
of policy equivalence classes in SICS. For example, the test network with 100K rules
produces approximately 200 equivalence classes; whereas the number of sub-intervals
calculated using PrefixMatch is over 9000. This highlights the efficiency of the SICS
approach compared with the process used by PrefixMatch when it finds the intervals
pertaining to the same set of prefixes, especially when the size of the network is large.
As shown in Table 3.1, the construction of the gateway in SICS only uses 368.3ms for
the network with 100K rules and it is still less than 10s when the size of the network
increases to 800K.
Incremental rule update cost. In this set of experiments, we first construct the
packet classifier using a subset of predicates and then keep adding new or deleting
existing predicates. In Fig. 3.7, we measure the time cost to update each predicate.
We find that the medium time cost for updating a predicate does not have a distinct
difference when the network size increases. The medium time cost for updating a
predicate is less than 0.5 ms for all networks.
PrefixMatch in Embark may need to be reconstructed when a rule changes and the
reconstruction process costs nearly 100s. PrefixMatch can still process packets using
old configurations during the reconstruction; however, the long update delay may incur
packet losses and harm the accuracy of middlebox processing. The situation worsens
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when updates happen frequently.
Throughput. We measure the throughput of the gateway in SICS by the number
of queries per second (qps). Packets used in the experiments are generated uniformly
with respect to equivalence classes and results for various network sizes are shown in
Fig. 3.8. From the figure, we find that the gateway in SICS can achieve 3.92 Mpps for
the network with 100K rules. For the largest network with 800K rules, the throughput
is 2.2 Mpps. For all networks, the throughput of the gateway in SICS is higher than
Embark by approximately 20%.
Memory usage. The gateway of SICS only stores predicates, calculated by the rule
composition module, instead of rules. Predicates are represented as BDDs in our imple-
mentation. For each predicate, the controller maintains a representation list recording a
subset of equivalence classes and their corresponding labels whose disjunction is equal
to the predicate. Each equivalence class is represented as a set of pointers to predicates
which contain the equivalence class. With Embark, the memory cost of the data struc-
ture for PrefixMatch is also calculated. For all network sizes, the gateway of SICS uses
less memory than Embark. The memory cost is 0.267MB for SICS and 0.274MB for
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Embark when the network size is 100K. For the largest network with 800K rules, SICS
and Embark uses 0.349MB and 1.345MB respectively. Neither the gateway in SICS
nor Embark consumes appreciable memory since they only store the classifier and not
the rules.
Scalability of the gateway. As shown in previous results, the performance of Em-
bark degrades sharply as the total number of rules increases. Compared with Embark,
the performance of SICS mainly depends on the number of equivalence classes calcu-
lated from these rules, which is a much smaller value than the number of rules. Given
processing rules and service chaining requirements, the number of equivalence classes
is determined by the number of various possible actions at the middleboxes and the
service function chains, not by the total number of rules. For example, a firewall with
10K ACL rules produces only two equivalence classes, with each one corresponding to
the action deny and allow, respectively.
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Bandwidth Overhead
We evaluate the extra bandwidth overhead between the enterprise and the cloud.
Embark introduces a 20-byte overhead per IPv4 packet because it converts them to
IPv6. SICS only inserts a 16-bit label into the options field of IPv4 packets which
encodes up to 65536 equivalence classes (cloud-wide behavior). For middleboxes that
modify packet headers, SICS uses another 16 bits as the identifier to represent rewritten
header fields. For stateful middelboxes, SICS adds a 32-bit connection ID. Hence, the
total per-packet bandwidth overhead introduced by SICS is 64 bits or 8 bytes. This is
placed in the options field of IPv4 protocol header.
Processing Delay
SICS employs a similar middlebox outsourcing architecture as Embark which in-
volves encryption and redirection overhead. Compared with local processing, de-
ploying SICS in the Amazon VPC incurs hundreds of milliseconds processing delay;
whereas an ISP based deployment with a larger footprint with respect to the Amazon
VPC can reduce the delay to tens of milliseconds [71].
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3.7.2 In-cloud Middleboxes
In this section, we evaluate the performance of label-matching based in-cloud mid-
dleboxes. We develop middleboxes using Click [68] and lookup tables using (2,4)-
Cuckoo hash tables [46], with each uses 64 KB memory.
Throughput of in-cloud middleboxes. For comparison, we also implement a Click
firewall and a Click NAT that examine packet header based rule tables. Each middlebox
has 1000 IPv4 5-tuple rules. Fig. 3.9 shows the throughput in thousand of packets
per second (kpps, log scale) for the two middleboxes. We see that the throughput
of label-matching based firewall and NAT in SICS is about 8000 kpps, which shows
an improvement of two orders of magnitude over their header based pattern matching
counterparts.
Reacting to middlebox failures and overload. We consider two dynamic scenar-
ios: (1) a middlebox fails and (2) traffic overload at a middlebox. We measure the
reaction time of SICS for each scenario and the results are shown in Fig. 3.10. When a
middlebox fails, we need to migrate the state of the failed middlebox to a new instance
and configure the network to reroute packets with certain labels to the new instance.
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To prevent traffic overload at a middlebox, in addition to middlebox state migration,
we need to add new predicates to split a portion of traffic on the current middlebox
to another middlebox. This requires additional updating of the packet classifier at the
gateway and representation lists at the controller. From Fig. 3.10, we see that the over-
all time to react to middlebox failure and traffic overload is low (several milliseconds)
and in fact the overhead is negligible.
3.8 Related Work
APLOMB [102] and Jingling [53] are the pioneer of middlebox outsourcing. APLOMB
demonstrates that the latency inflation due to outsourcing is negligible. As a parallel
work to APLOMB, Jingling focuses on the interfaces and inter-operations between the
cloud and customers. Neither of them takes privacy issues into consideration. Blind-
box [104] enables equality based operations on encrypted payload of packets for a
specific class of middleboxes, DPI; However, it cannot examine packet headers and/or
perform range queries. Melis et al. [82] model the behavior of common middleboxes
and proposed a privacy preserving middlebox outsourcing scheme based on fully ho-
momorphic encryption [40], which has very poor performance. Embark [71] presents
the method PrefixMatch to hide the packet header and rule information from the cloud.
PrefixMatch uses the set of processing rules to divide each header field into multiple
intervals and then it assigns a random IPv6 prefix to each interval. At a local gateway,
every header field of a packet is mapped to a pseudorandom value of an IPv6 field sep-
arately and the entire IP packet header is mapped to a new IPv6 header. PrefixMatch
does not support incremental rule updates and updating one rule requires all rules to be
reconstructed, which may take as long as 100s. Before that, packets are still routed and
processed as the old configuration which may incur unexpected packet loss and inac-
curate processing. From a security perspective, such a field-by-field encryption scheme
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is vulnerable to certain types of attack, such as chosen plaintext attack. More details
will be analyzed in §3.5. Splitbox [33] distributes a rule to several virtual machines
(VMs), which reside on multiple clouds assuming an adversary cannot corrupt all VMs
simultaneously. Computation results from all VMs are collected by a local middlebox
and the final actions of the packets are calculated at the local middlebox. It is difficult
for Splitbox to support service function chaining. Meanwhile, Splitbox increases band-
width overhead several-fold as it needs to send multiple copies of a packet to different
VMs for the same network function.
SafeBricks [90] and Shieldbox [109] are state of the art enclave-based middlebox
outsourcing solutions. Besides the potential security threats from curious middlebox
providers and side channel attacks, they impact performance by around 15% across
different in-cloud middleboxes due to the use of SGX enclaves [90] and do not sup-
port incremental update. Changing of service chains and provisions (e.g., number of
deployed middlebox instances) requires to rebuild the whole enclave which takes a few
minutes.
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Chapter 4
Epinoia: Intent Checker for Stateful
Networks
4.1 Epinoia Design and Architecture
We first describe several motivating examples to illustrate some challenges for
checking network intents in stateful networks. Then, we provide insights behind the
design choices and an overview of our system, Epinoia.
Consider the network pictured in Figure 4.1 with an end host subnet S0 and a server
subnet S1. FW1 and FW2 are two stateful firewalls and PY is a forward proxy that
works as an intermediate agent between clients and servers. The operators intend to
block S0 from S1. That is, hosts in S0 should not be able to send any packet to servers in
S1. The bottom of Figure 4.1 shows configuration snippets that implement this intent.
Line 1 is a security rule at FW1 that denies all packets from S0 to S1. However, as
FW1 conducts stateful processing, those packets may still be allowed if they belong
to established connections initiated from S1. To prevent such connections, a similar
deny rule for packets from S1 to S0 (line 3) is added at FW2. Even with this simple
example, checking intent using existing tools could give inaccurate results and be time-
consuming.
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Static vs. temporal modeling. Recent work on network control plane configura-
tion (e.g., BGP configuration) synthesis [51] and verification [35] have shown routing
messages between routers can be effectively modeled using static boolean variables.
Following this idea, as in Figure 4.1, the property that a packet P0 from S0 is able to
reach S1 through FW1 and FW2 can be represented using a Boolean variable r0. As
P0 is denied by the security rule at FW1, for r0 to be True, it implies that a earlier
reverse packet P1 was relayed by FW1 from S1 to S0, denoted as r1, where r0 ⇒ r1.
For P1 to reach FW1, it must first be allowed by FW2. Likewise, due to the deny rule
at FW2, it requires a reverse packet P0 to go through FW2 from S0 to S1, or denoted as
r1 ⇒ r0. Given the stateful network and the configurations, analyses solely based on
such static modeling techniques report a violation of the block intent when both r0 and
r1 are assigned to True. However, this turns out to be a false alarm. FW1 will allow
P0 only if it saw P1 before, which requires that P1 went through FW2 earlier. Thus, it
cannot rely on the state created by P0. This example shows the necessity of utilizing
temporal modeling instead of static modeling for stateful networks as packets may have
different behavior at stateful NFs when they arrive in different sequences.
Partial vs. complete path set. To scale with modern solvers, several optimization
techniques have been studied in solver-based approaches [35, 88]. The core idea is to
reduce the size of constraints given to the solver by restricting packet headers and their
forwarding paths based on destination addresses. That is, the checking is conducted
over a slice of the network (e.g., a single forwarding path). Though such simplifica-
tions could reduce the time cost, they may also lose completeness and lead to unsound
checking results, especially when there are NFs that modify packet headers. One such
example is shown in Figure 4.1. Line 6 of the configuration snippets indicates that
PY in the bottom will explicitly intercept request packets from S0 to S1 and forward
them with a new source S2 (line 7). Those packets are also allowed at FW2 (line 5).
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//                       Configurations
P0
P0
P1
S1P1
P2
P3
P3
Security policy on FW1  
1  service ANY address S0 S1 deny
2  service ANY address S1 S0 allow
Security policy on FW2  
3  service ANY address S1 S0 deny
4  service ANY address S0 S1 allow
5  service ANY address S2 S1 allow
Proxy policy on PY
6  web-proxy explicit enable address S0 S1
7  outgoing-ip S2
S0 P1Stateful FW1
Stateful FW2
PY
Figure 4.1: Example NF configuration snippets.
Instead of sending packets directly to S1, a host in S0 could first send packets to PY ,
which then forwards the packets to S1. This indicates a potential violation of the block
intent between S0 and S1. In addition, networks are built with fault tolerance. Critical
services are multi-homed, and communication endpoints have redundant paths. The
dynamic nature of the underlying routing plane may assign different paths at different
time even for the same set of packets. The NF processing taken depends on the path
a packet actually traverses. Configurations of NFs must ensure that no potential path
violates network intents.
Host vs. group level querying. In existing intent-based systems, all intents are
specified with respect to end point groups (e.g., engineering department, a group of
servers) [4, 30, 93]. Recall the previous intent: S0 should not be able to reach S1.
Consider S0 as a guest network with 100 hosts and S1 to be a data center with 1000
servers. To check the block intent, the naive approach of exploding the query into
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Network Graph
Continuous 
Verification
Results 
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Vendor-neutral 
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Epinoia
Network info,  NF 
configuration updates
Intent-based
policies
Intent 
specification
Check 
results
Figure 4.2: Epinoia workflow
100 thousand separate queries is too slow. A typical effective solution would convert
the original query and check whether its negation can be satisfied. However, due to the
stateful processing of NFs, this technique cannot be applied for stateful networks. More
details are discussed in Section 4.3.1. We observe that NF processing policy commonly
partitions end hosts into policy equivalence groups, i.e., into set of end hosts, to which
the same policy applies. In Epinoia, endpoints relating to the same set of intents are
represented as groups and queries for the same group are aggregated to achieve better
efficiency.
Epinoia Overview. Figure 4.2 illustrates an overview of the Epinoia workflow with
its key components. Epinoia allows users/applications to specify network intents based
on extended policy graph models (Section 4.2.1).
NFs from different vendors may support different configurations and features. We
break down the functionalities of advanced NFs into function units and propose vendor-
neutral configuration models for each function unit (Section 4.2.2). Such function units
85
can be combined and extended to support real-world NFs. To correlate configurations
of NFs and packet behavior in stateful networks, we formulate key causal precedence
relationships [97] among NF packet I/Os and states (Section 4.2.2). All constraints
are attached to a network graph, containing all potential paths needed to be checked
for each intent to ensure that NF configurations match intents under arbitrary routing
dynamics.
Along each path, an end to end intent is decomposed into sub checking tasks (Sec-
tion 4.3). Each smaller task can be efficiently checked using a SMT solver. The con-
tinuous verification module maintains a causality graph with all checked results (Sec-
tion 4.4). The goal is to enable the intent checker to check for network-wide intent
violations incrementally whenever there are changes to network and/or intent. Finally,
checking results are analyzed and all reported violations are returned to the network OS
or intent creators.
4.2 Intent and Network Models
4.2.1 Network Intent Specification
Network intents specify the desired outcome of the network. In this dissertation, we
look at two very basic intents: reachability and isolation, which can be used as building
blocks to implement other advanced intents.
Epinoia extends the intent specifications in PGA [93]. Our choice is motivated by
the intuitive graph representation of network intents, support of NF chaining. Figure 4.3
shows four example network intents in an enterprise network. Nodes are pre-defined
end point groups and directed edges indicate the communication intents between end-
points. Boxes along edges specify the required NF traversal for each communication.
In addition to the required ones, packets are allowed to go through other NFs by de-
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Figure 4.3: Example network intents
fault. Constraints on possible optional NFs are annotated on each edge segment in
the form of {NF1...NFn}. Similarly, avoidance of NFs are specified using the form
! {NF1...NFn}. For an isolation intent, a double slash is added on the edge to indicate
that the communication must be blocked. The four intents in Figure 4.3 are: i) Market-
ing department should be able to access web services and the traffic must go through a
NAT and a load balancer. ii) The department should also be able to access remote sites
by going through a NAT and possibly one or more firewalls before the NAT. iii) Packets
from remote sites to web services must be inspected by a firewall and a load balancer.
No proxy is allowed before they are inspected by any firewall. iv) Packets from guest
networks to the marketing department must be blocked.
4.2.2 Network Models
NF Configuration Models
Recent work on NF modeling has shown that NFs of the same type from different
vendors have similar operating logic [88, 106, 114]. For example, the firewall func-
tion of iptables [94], pfSense [100] as well as Palo Alto Firewall [87] all start with
detecting whether a packet belongs or relates to an established connection. Then the
packet is matched against a list of ACLs. If one is found and it allows the packet,
then the packet is forwarded; otherwise it is dropped. Contrary to the similarity in the
operating logic, we observe that NFs differ greatly in the format or features they sup-
port in their configurations, which are the major input that operators provide and want
87
to check before they are installed into NFs. To mitigate the complexity brought by
vendor specificity, open source communities such as OpenConfig [84] as well as some
emerging IBN platforms in industry (e.g., Apstra AOS [4] and Google Zero Touch
Network [69]) have been working on designing vendor-neutral configuration models.
However, most of those models are for routers or routing related protocols and none
include NFs. Another observation is that advanced NFs usually consist of a chain of
basic functions. For example, a Palo Alto Firewall can be configured to implement a
firewall-NAT-Load balancer chain. Inspired by the observations above, in Epinoia, we
propose vendor-agnostic configuration models for common function units (e.g., address
objects, security rules, NAT rules) which are written as extensions of the OpenConfig
YANG models. Models for each function unit can be combined to form the configura-
tion model of more advanced NFs. Moreover, with off-the-shelf tools, configurations
written using the model can be easily converted into serialization formats (e.g., JSON)
for transmission or other third-party services (e.g., network intent verification). List-
ing 4.1 shows an example configuration instance of a real security rule in JSON. The
model is extensible to support additional features based on the actual functionalities of
NFs.
. . . " s e c u r i t y r u l e s " : {
" s e c u r i t y r u l e " : {
" 23 " : {
" i d " : " 23 " ,
" c o n f i g " : {
" s r c a d d r e s s " : " g u e s t " ,
" d s t a d d r e s s " : " m a r k e t i n g " ,
" s e r v i c e " : "ANY" ,
. . . " a c t i o n " : "DENY" ,
Listing 4.1: Snippets of a security rule in JSON
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Network Graph
To obtain the complete path set that should be checked for intents, Epinoia models
a network as an undirected graph. Nodes in the graph are either endpoints or NFs while
edges represent possible packet exchanges between those nodes. Such a graph can be
extracted by traversing the network topology: if the current node is a switch or has been
visited, continue to examine the next node; otherwise, create a new node in the network
graph representing the corresponding NF or endpoints. Note that Epinoia does not aim
to check the correctness of stateless switching fabrics as there already exist plenty of
solutions [62, 63, 65, 118]. Meanwhile, by removing the switching fabric, the network
graphs result in much smaller sizes (degrade the size by at least 50% [103]) but are still
able to capture all potential paths.
Figure 4.4 shows a network graph of a typical enterprise network. Internal end-
points m1 and g1 belong to the marketing and guest networks, connected to remote
sites with two firewalls. A web service is hosted in a demilitarized zone, guarded by a
destination NAT and a load balancer. Epinoia leverages an off-line path generation step
to obtain all simple paths. For most scenarios, the set of paths is fairly static and can be
precomputed (e.g., regular hardware maintenance), we expect this step to be performed
infrequently.
Encoding NF packet processing
The functionality of a NF can be factored into two generic parts: i) a classifier that
searches for a matching over packet header fields or payload, and ii) a transfer function
that transforms incoming and outgoing packets. Upon receiving a packet, based on
configurations, a NF processes the packet with the actions corresponding to the rules or
states that the packet matches. Naturally, the input packet on which an output depends
must be received before the output is produced. In other words, there exists a causal
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precedence relationship [97] between the input and output. We can generically express
this relationship as sendp2 ⇒ recvp1 , where [A]⇒ [B] denotes event A depends on B.
p1 and p2 correspond to the same packet before and after NF processing. Both p1 and p2
are subject to certain constraints determined by NF configurations, e.g., for a firewall,
p1 and p2 are exactly the same since firewalls do not modify packets; p1 must match
an established connection or be allowed by security rules. States at NFs correspond to
packet histories. For example, if a content c is cached at a proxy, the proxy must have
received a request packet for c and a response packet from the server that holds c before
it can be cached at the proxy. Written generically: states ⇒ recvP , where P represents
a sequence of packets required to establish state s. Such causality also exist between
one NF’s output and another NF’s input. For example, a packet must be sent out before
it is received. Written generically: recvp ⇒ sendp.
A rich set of causalities exists in NFs, e.g., a timeout must be reached before a state
expires; a configuration must be loaded before it can be applied to packets. However,
most of these causalities are orthogonal to our intents. We therefore only consider
packet processing causalities that affect how packets are forwarded or modified.
To encode the causal precedence relationship to a format that can be accepted by
a SMT solver, it is intuitive to model packet behavior at NFs using two Boolean val-
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ued uninterpreted functions with universal/existential quantifiers. For example, we de-
fine send(n,i,p,t) as a sending event of packet p by NF n through interface i
at time t. Similarly, receiving a packet receive is denoted as recv(n,i,p,t). We
aggregate all interfaces of a NF into either the internal (i==0) or external (i==1) in-
terface as some NFs may apply different processing policies for inbound and outbound
packets. The send and receive functions return True when the input arguments corre-
spond to a valid event in the network; or they must return False.
We show how to capture causal precedence relationships using example SMT en-
codings for some common stateful NFs.
Stateful firewall. A stateful firewall (Listing 4.2) utilizes ACLs to determine whether
to allow or deny a packet from a new connection. ACLs can be modeled using a pred-
icate acl_func(a1, a2), where a1 and a2 correspond to the source and destination ad-
dress of a packet. Packets that belong to established connections are allowed by a
stateful firewall even if they are denied by ACLs. An established state indicates that the
firewall has received and allowed a reverse packet before.
F o r a l l [ i0, p, t0 ] send(fw, i0, p, t0) I m p l i e s
E x i s t s [ i1, t1 ] recv(fw, i1, p, t1) ∧ t1<t0 ∧ i0 6= i1
F o r a l l [ i0, p0, t0 ]
send(fw, i0, p0, t0) ∧ ¬ acl_func(p0.src, p0.dst) I m p l i e s
E x i s t s [ i1, p1, t1 ] recv(fw, i1, p1, t1) ∧ t1<t0 ∧ i0 6= i1 ∧
acl_func(p1.src, p1.dst) ∧ p1 == p0.reverse
Listing 4.2: Encoding of a stateful firewall
Load balancer. A load balancer (Listing 4.3) holds a shared address (share_addr(a))
for a back-end server pool (server_addr(a)). Requests sent to the load balancer are
randomly distributed to one of the servers and replies from servers look for a matched
request which is sent back by the load balancer.
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F o r a l l [p0, t0 ] send(lb, 1, p0, t0) I m p l i e s
E x i s t s [p1, t1 ] recv(lb, 0, p1, t1) ∧ t1<t0 ∧ share_addr(p1.dst)
∧ p1.src == p0.src
F o r a l l [p0, t0 ] send(lb, 0, p0, t0) I m p l i e s
E x i s t s [p1, p2, t1, t2 ] recv(lb, 1, p1, t1) ∧ recv(lb, 0, p2, t2) ∧
t2<t1<t0 ∧ p2 == p0.reverse ∧
share_addr(p2.dst) ∧ server_addr(p1.src) ∧
p0.dst == p1.dst == p2.src
Listing 4.3: Encoding of a load balancer
NAT. NAT can either work as a source or a destination NAT. For outbound packets,
a source NAT (Listing 4.4) translates the private source IP to a public IP of the NAT,
modeled using a predicate pub_addr(a). If an inbound packet matches an established
state, the source NAT translates its destination IP back to the private IP. A destination
NAT maintains a one to one destination address mapping for connections initiated from
outside networks and has a similar encoding as a load balancer.
F o r a l l [p0, t0 ] send(nat, 1, p0, t0) I m p l i e s
E x i s t s [p1, t1 ] recv(nat, 0, p1, t1) ∧ t1 < t0 ∧ pub_addr(p0.src)
∧ p1.dst == p0.dst
F o r a l l [p0, t0 ] send(nat, 0, p0, t0) I m p l i e s
E x i s t s [p1, p2, t1, t2 ] recv(nat, 1, p1, t1) ∧ recv(nat, 0, p2, t2) ∧
t2 < t1 < t0 ∧ p2 == p0.reverse ∧
pub_addr(p1.dst) ∧ p0.src == p1.src
Listing 4.4: Encoding of a source NAT
Reverse proxy. A reverse proxy (Listing 4.5) is configured with ACLs specifying
which clients have access to content originating at certain servers. Upon receiving a
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request that is allowed by ACLs, it initiate a new request to the corresponding server
if the contents have not been cached. When receiving responses from the server, it
forwards the response to the client who originally requested the content.
F o r a l l [p0, t0 ] send(py, 1, p0, t0) I m p l i e s
E x i s t s [p1, t1 ] recv(py, 0, p1, t1) ∧ t1<t0 ∧ p0.src == py ∧
acl_func(p1.src, p1.dst) ∧ p0.payload == p1.payload
F o r a l l [p0, t0 ] send(py, 0, p0, t0) I m p l i e s
E x i s t s [p1, p2t1, t2 ] recv(py, 1, p1, t1) ∧ recv(py, 0, p2, t2) ∧
t2<t1<t0 ∧ acl_func(p2.src, p2.dst) ∧ acl_func(p0.dst, p0.src)
p1.dst == py ∧ p0.src == p1.src == p2.dst ∧
p0.payload == p1.payload == p2.payload
Listing 4.5: Encoding of a reverse proxy
4.3 Intent Decomposer
Given a network intent, we can use a SMT solver to check whether the intent is
satisfied or not. However, even with the smallest network (18 nodes) we use in our
evaluation, the solver cannot return an answer in a reasonable time. To improve the
scalability, one key observation is that though a network intent specifies a high level
end to end objective, it is possible to decompose it into several sub-tasks, where each
task can be checked separately. In this section, we present how the intent decomposer
of Epinoia decomposes network intents in two dimensions.
4.3.1 Atomic Address Object
The concept of address objects (mostly referred as zones or aliases) are widely used
in network management ecosystems. Assume we are about to configure a set of security
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Figure 4.6: Calculating the set of atomic address object for three address objects p1, p2
and p3
rules guarding the servers in a data center to allow traffic from hosts in the marketing
department while blocking mobile devices connected to the guest network. Instead of
spelling out each address explicitly when a rule is added, we can define address objects
as placeholders (e.g., data center, marketing department, guest network); each rule can
be applied directly to such address objects. We define the set of atomic address objects
which specifies the largest common refinement over the address space given the set
of address objects. As is shown in Figure 4.6, three address objects p1, p2 and p3 are
represented as ranges with all the endpoints laid out on an axis in increasing order. p3
has two ranges as it corresponds to two non-continuous subnets.
We consider all the non-overlapping intervals I0 ∼ I6 formed by each consecutive
pair of endpoints. The set of atomic address objects can be easily calculated by com-
bining intervals that belong to the same set of address objects. For example, I1 and
I4 are two separate atomic address objects. I0 ∪ I2 ∪ I6 and I3 ∪ I5 are the other two
atomic address objects. In addition, an address object can be represented as a union of
a subset of atomic address objects. For example, p2 = I3 ∪ I4 ∪ I5. We call packets
sent from one atomic address object to another atomic address object as a traffic class.
With the same network state, packets within the same traffic class are treated equally
at all NFs in the entire network as they match the same set of processing rules. An
endpoint group in an intent can be represented as a union of atomic address objects
whose intersection with the endpoint group is not empty. To check an intent between
two endpoint groups, instead of querying each pair of end hosts, we can instead simply
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check the more compact traffic classes between the two endpoint groups. For example,
an intent from endpoint group e0 to e1 can be checked using two traffic classes (s0, d0)
and (s1, d0) if e0 ∩ s0,1 6= , e0 ⊂ s0 ∪ s1, e1 ∩ d0 6=  and e1 ⊂ d0. The benefit is
two-fold:
Header matching elimination. Most NFs decide processing actions for incoming
packets by matching packet headers against processing rules. The natural way to rep-
resent a packet and a processing rule for this check is to use bit vectors and check for
equality using a bit mask. However, bit vectors are expensive and solvers typically con-
vert them to SAT. In Epinoia, the matching fields of processing rules are represented
as a set of integers. The integers are identifiers for atomic address objects. Header
matching at NFs are converted to integer membership checking which is more efficient
for solvers. For processing rules that modify packet headers (e.g., NAT rule), the mod-
ified addresses are also represented as one or more atomic address objects. Depending
on a deterministic (one to one mapping) or nondeterministic (one to multiple mapping)
modification, an atomic address object is mapped to a certain or random atomic address
object.
Adapting to temporal modeling. A solver usually returns a single solution when
the set of constraints are satisfiable. Sometimes, we need all solutions for a query, i.e.,
all hosts in the marketing department should be able to reach the web service. In static
modeling, this problem can be solved by testing the satisfiability of the negation of the
query, However, with the temporal modeling required by stateful NFs, the negation of
the query can be satisfied either with a packet that would be blocked in the network, or
a packet sequence that could not have existed because it violates the casual precedence
constraints. We need to differentiate between these, and find only true packet loss.
To do this, we can only check an intent directly, which could boil down to a large of
number of sub-queries corresponding to each pair of end hosts specified in the intent.
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With atomic address objects, the number of necessary queries as well as the total time
cost is significantly reduced as the checking results can be applied to all end hosts that
belong to the same atomic address object.
4.3.2 Path Segmentation
Epinoia pre-calculates all paths for each intent and an intent is satisfied if there is no
violation along all potential paths. Along a path, checking an end to end intent can be
divided into several sub-tasks, each of which includes a single NF. The intuition is based
on two observations: i) Many NFs have concrete constraints on headers of incoming or
outgoing packets. For example, a source NAT translates private addresses to its public
addresses; A load balancer uniformly distributes packets heading to its shared address
to a set of servers. Such concrete constraints are specified in NF configurations and can
be propagated along the path, which helps remove redundant information that the SMT
solver might otherwise have to discover by itself. ii) State constraints refer to the local
packet processing history at a NF. To check if a state could be valid, only constraints
within the NF need to be included.
To illustrate the idea of path segmentation, we review the intent (i) in Figure 4.3
within the network graph shown in Figure 4.4. Two potential paths from m1 to Web
are shown in Figure 4.5. Address pairs annotated on each path segment specify the
concrete constraints on source and destination addresses of packets that can reach this
segment. s0 denotes the atomic address object corresponds to m1 while d0 represents
Web. For packets going through FW1, FW2 and LB, the source address of packets
are always s0 since no NF along the path modifies the source address. For the last hop,
the destination address must be d0. As a load balancer requires an incoming packet to
use its shared address as the destination address, denoted as d1, the first three segments
all have d1 as destination address. For packets going through FW1, NAT and LB, the
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Figure 4.7: The causality graph for the reachability between m1 and Web.
source address is always s0 while the destination address is modified from d2 to d1 and
d1 to d0 at NAT and LB respectively.
To check the reachability intent between m1 and Web, Epinoia starts with checking
whether those concrete and state constraints within a segment can be satisfied using a
solver. A path can be valid only if all segments are satisfiable; otherwise the path is not
valid.
4.4 Continuous verification
After checking each segment, Epinoia still needs to combine the results returned
by the solver to make sure they are consistent with each other. Meanwhile, upon a
network change, Epinoia should be able to identify the affected parts that may need
to be rechecked. To achieve these goals, Epinoia maintains a customized causality
graph that stores all checked results. Intent checking can be conducted incrementally
by traversing the causality graph.
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4.4.1 Causality Graph
A node in a causality graph represents either a packet sending or receiving event.
Each node is tagged with a pair of atomic address objects specifying the set of source
and destination addresses of the packets. An arrow in the graph indicates a causal
precedence relationship among two events. The event on the front end depends on
and must happen after the event on the rear end. For a single NF, it is straightforward
to construct a causality graph of packet sending or receiving events required by the
satisfiability assignment from the solver. When there is more than one NF, receiving
a packet must be traced back along the selected path to a packet sending node. If
the corresponding packet sending node already exists, an arrow is added between the
sending and the receiving node. If not, the packet sending is checked within the upward
NF and other nodes or edges are added as needed. This procedure continues until the
packet receiving node is traced back to an endpoint.
Figure 4.7 shows an example causality graph for the two potential paths in Fig-
ure 4.5. Atomic address objects are represented as integers. 1 and 3 correspond to m1
and Web respectively; 5 is the shared address configured at the load balancer; the NAT
maintains two deterministic atomic address object mapping: from 4 to 5 and 6 to 7.
Consider the FW1 − NAT − LB path, possible packets received and forwarded by
FW1 are (1, 4) and (1, 6) since NAT only accepts packets heading to 4 and 6. We
assume both packets are allowed by FW1. Later, only packet (1, 4) goes through NAT
as the transformed packet must be (1, 5) to be processed by LB. At LB, packet (1, 5)
is changed to (1, 3) and finally sent to Web. Similarly, we add nodes and edges for path
FW1 − FW2 − LB. We add tag ti along each edge to identify path i. Based on the
causal relationship, it’s obvious that a path i is valid if the subgraph tagged by ti has no
loop, which indicates that there exists a valid time sequence for all packet sending and
receiving events to achieve the end to end intent. In this example, both paths 1 and 2 are
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Figure 4.8: The causality graph under a rule insertion and a link up.
valid. To reuse the checked results, both satisfied and unsatisfied checking (not shown
for simplicity) results are stored in the graph. In Epinoia, only one causality graph
is maintained as the checked results can be shared among paths and intents. When
the graph is storing more results, the size of a sub-graph tagged by a path identifier is
independent of the complexity of the causality graph.
As events occur to the network, Epinoia identifies affected intents and incrementally
updates the causality graph. We handle the following six events.
Adding an address object. When a new address object is added, an existing atomic
address object may be divided into two new ones. Nodes and edges related to the atomic
address object should be duplicated to reflect the changes. However, an intent needs
rechecking only if a new rule using the new address object is inserted.
Deleting an existing address object. Similarly, when an address object is deleted,
two existing atomic address objects may specify the same atomic address object. Du-
plicated nodes and edges in the causality graph are removed. No intent needs to be
rechecked.
Inserting a rule. To identify the set of intents that may be affected by the new rule,
each node in causality graph maintains an attribute specifying the set of intents and
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corresponding paths relying on the node. For example, the packet receiving node (1, 5)
in FW2 is created by intent (i) in Figure 4.3 along path FW1 − FW2 − LB. When
a new rule is inserted at a NF, Epinoia first identifies existing packet receiving nodes
that match the new rule and the set of intents in the attributes of those nodes must be
rechecked. Meanwhile, the behavior of some other packet receiving nodes may also
be affected by the new inserted rule indirectly, even though they do not match the rule.
Though the remaining satisfied checking results must not be affected (if they are, their
packet receiving nodes should have matched the rule), all other intents with unsatisfied
checking results within the NF should be rechecked.
We show how the causality graph is updated when a deny rule for packet (1, 5) is
added at FW2 in Figure 4.8. Now packet sending (1, 5) requires a previous sending of
(5, 1), which then is traced back to a sending (5, 1) at LB. At LB, the packet sending
(5, 1) relies on a previous sending of (1, 3), which is traced back to a receiving and
sending of (1, 5) at LB and FW2 respectively. After adding all necessary nodes and
edges, the subgraph tagged by t2 introduces a loop, so path 2 becomes invalid. Edges
only tagged by t2 are removed from the causality graph (dotted lines).
Deleting a rule. When a rule is deleted, intents relying on the packet receiving
matching the deleted rule need to be rechecked as they will be handled by lower priority
rules, and may result in different checking results.
Link up. A link up may lead to two cases where the graph needs to be updated.
For each intent, Epinoia first extracts new paths from the pre-calculated path set that
traverses the new link and checks if the paths are valid. Meanwhile, Epinoia checks
whether packet receiving previously cannot be traced back to endpoints at the two NFs
connected by the new link become valid. If so, the set of paths relying on those packet
receiving events may become valid. As shown in Figure 4.8, if a link is up between
FW1 and LB, a new path 3 is added by going through FW1 and LB.
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Link down. When a link goes down, all the edges using that link are deleted, which
in turn removes all the paths going through those edges.
Complexity analysis. The rule insertion has the highest complexity of O(nd(V +
E)), where, n is the number of atomic address objects and d is the diameter of the net-
work. V and E denote the number of nodes and edges of a subgraph tagged by a path.
When a rule is inserted, Epinoia first checks the set of existing packet receiving events
that are affected by the new rule (There exist O(n) such packet receiving events). For
each affected events, Epinoia collects checked results along its path. Since the maxi-
mum path length is the diameter d, this is O(nd). If all path segments are satisfiable,
Epinoia extracts the sub-graph tagged by the path and uses a graph traversal algorithm
(e.g., depth first search) to detect if there is a loop. Thus, the overall runtime complexity
is O(nd(V + E)).
4.4.2 Running Intent Checking Queries
Given an intent, Epinoia divides the intent into sub checking tasks using the intent
decomposer. With the checking results maintained by the causality graph, Epinoia calls
a SMT solver only when a sub-task has not been checked before. For a reachability
intent, valid paths are collected for each traffic class. Each valid path corresponds to
a sequence of NFs in the network. Epinoia finds all valid paths that satisfy the NF
chaining requirement in an intent. The remaining valid paths correspond to the ones
that are reachable but violate the NF traversal requirements. For a block intent, any
valid path indicates a potential intent violation.
Once an intent is added, it is evaluated against all future snapshots of the network
graph if necessary, unless the intent is removed from the network. For all reported vio-
lations, Epinoia reports corresponding network elements or paths the violating traffic is
taking. Each piece of configuration is tagged with its intent. Given a reported violation,
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Figure 4.9: Number of atomic address object as number of rules increases.
the tag helps trace back to the intent that generates the configuration.
4.5 Evaluation
We have developed a prototype of Epinoia in approximately 6K lines of Python. To
evaluate Epinoia, we first examine how it deals with a real-world enterprise ACL dataset
and then investigate the effectiveness of the intent decomposer. Finally we evaluate the
runtime performance of Epinoia. All our experiments were done on a machine with 4
cores, 2.93 GHz Intel Xeon Processor and 6 GB RAM. We report times taken when
the checking is performed using a single core. We use a SMT solver Z3 [43] for our
evaluations. SMT solvers rely on randomized search algorithms, and their performance
can vary widely across runs. The results reported are generated from 100 runs of each
experiment.
4.5.1 Real-world evaluation
We obtain an ACL dataset from a policy management system of a large enterprise
network. These policies are specified using 801 pre-defined address objects located at
137 compartments (groups of subsets). Each ACL rule permits or denies the commu-
nication between two address objects, each address object corresponds to one or more
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Figure 4.10: Number of atomic address objects and IP addresses for name groups.
IP subnets (address objects may overlap with each other). Given a set of ACLs, we cal-
culate the number of atomic address objects based on the address objects used by those
ACLs. As shown in Figure 4.9, the number of atomic address objects increases with a
slope less than 1/3 with increased rule set size. This indicates the similarity between
rules with respect to their target address space. In total, there are over 19K ACL rules
and 4508 atomic address objects. While some atomic address objects contain large ad-
dress blocks, about half (2510) of them specify only a single IP. The size of the address
objects also varies widely, ranging from a single IP to over 600 non-contiguous subnets
(representing around 100 million IP addresses). In contrast, the variation in the number
of atomic address objects within an address object is much smaller. As shown in Fig-
ure 4.10, address objects are sorted by the number of IPs within the object. Over 90%
of address objects have less than 6 atomic address objects. With fewer atomic address
objects, it’s more likely for Epinoia to achieve better performance when checking group
level intents.
Next we use Epinoia to detect potential security breaches that may occur using the
ACL dataset. We assume all compartments are connected with a full mesh topology
and the ACL policies conduct stateful processing. We measure the time cost to check
the reachability for each traffic class between two compartments. The average cost
is 0.78 seconds with a maximum of 3.32 seconds. In total, we found 351 potential
breaches due to inconsistent deny rules. For example, a packet matches a deny rule
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either at the local or the remote compartment, which indicates a block intent from the
administrator. However, the block intent may be violated if its reverse traffic is able to
pass the compartment.
4.5.2 Scalability
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Figure 4.11: Time taken to check a reachability query as # of rules increases.
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Figure 4.12: Time taken to check a reachability query as # of NFs increases.
To evaluate the scalability of Epinoia, we quantify the effectiveness of the intent
decomposer by measuring the time cost of an end to end reachability query. We connect
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Figure 4.13: Time taken to check all intents
two end hosts with a single firewall. Then we keep inserting ACL rules into the firewall
and measure the time cost to check the reachability between the two hosts.
First, we represent addresses as bit vectors (BV) in the SMT encoding and use it
as a baseline to show the effectiveness when atomic address objects (AA) are used.
As shown in Figure 4.11, the time cost of the query increases exponentially for bit-
vector based encoding while all queries cost less than one second when atomic address
objects are used. This speeds up the intent checking by 100x when there are 30 rules.
The reason is that bit vectors are expensive for SMT solvers and each rule inserted
introduces at least 32 extra variables. However, by aggregating addresses to atomic
address objects, symbolic variables representing IP prefixes are replaced with integers.
A satisfied query requires more time as it needs to calculate valid assignments for all
variables in the constraint set, while an unsatisfied query returns immediately when a
conflict is found.
To evaluate the benefit of path segmentation, we add additional firewalls between
the two hosts to create a firewall chain. We measure the time cost to check the reach-
ability between the two hosts when all the constraints along the path are solved as a
whole. This corresponds to a key optimization in VMN [88], where the checking is re-
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Figure 4.14: Time taken to recheck affected intents per network change.
stricted to the forwarding path between end hosts. When the path segmentation (PS) is
applied, we check each firewall one by one and sum up the time cost. As shown in Fig-
ure 4.12, when the path is checked as a whole, the time cost increases significantly with
increased number of firewalls. The SMT solver Z3 we used in our experiments cannot
return before timeout when the number of firewalls is larger than 9 for satisfied queries
and 10 for unsatisfied query. With path segmentation, the time cost increases linearly
and the maximum cost for satisfied query is 7.73 seconds. For unsatisfied queries, the
cost does not necessarily go up with increased number of NFs as the checking process
terminates whenever one of the segments cannot be satisfied. The maximum time cost
is 0.26 seconds, which highlights the effectiveness of the intent decomposer in Epinoia
for large networks.
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4.5.3 Runtime performance
In this set of experiments, we evaluate the runtime performance of Epinoia using
four topologies from Topology Zoo [67] with number of nodes ranging from 18 to 93.
In our experiments, we create 200 network intents, each of which contains 0 to 10 NFs
of different types and we randomly attach end hosts belonging to pre-defined address
objects to different nodes in the topology. We also randomly assign a NF instance to
each node in the topology. Epinoia executes a pre-computation procedure to enumerate
the paths for all the intents, which could be costly for large topologies. However, we
emphasize that this procedure only needs to be done once and this can be performed
off-line.
In the first experiment, we check each intent one after another, and all checked
results are stored in the causality graph. Figure 4.13 shows the cumulative time cost to
check all intents for the four networks. All time costs grow slightly as the number of
polices increases. The reason is that many intents share the same set of sub checking
tasks for different traffic classes. The checked results can be reused among intents when
there are no network changes.
With all the checked results, we next evaluate how Epinoia reacts to network dy-
namics. We randomly choose to insert/delete a rule or add/remove a link and measure
the time cost for Epinoia to identify and recheck the set of affected intents for each sce-
nario. As each network change may affect a different amount of intents, we report both
the average and maximum time cost to recheck the affected intents in each network.
As shown in Figure 4.14, the average cost of rechecking after a change is less than 10
seconds, with the maximum for inserting a rule in Internode being close to 20 seconds.
Without the incremental checking, a full check is required for all intents whenever there
is any change. The average speedup of Epinoia incremental checking is 34x, 79x, 94x
and 101x for each network respectively.
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4.6 Related Work
To model stateful NFs, existing approaches either work on extracting models by
analyzing NF source code [106, 113, 114] or hand crafted models [88] based on expert
knowledge. We take a different approach, in which we have designed vendor-agnostic
NF configuration models and construct NF forwarding models using key causality rela-
tionships. There is a rich body of work for verifying forwarding behaviors in stateless
networks [62, 63, 65, 118]. While these work can efficiently check a number of poli-
cies such as reachability and loop freedom, it is nontrivial to extend these work to
support stateful data planes. There are several proposals on verifying network control
planes [35, 52], where the processing is stateful; however, all of those work rely on
a converged routing state and cannot be used for stateful NFs. To check stateful net-
works, Symnet [106] runs symbolic execution over an abstracted NF implementation
and SFC-Checker [110] extends the network graph in HSA [63] by adding nodes for
each NF state. Both of these approaches are path-based and cannot check state consis-
tency between different NFs. VMN [88] also uses a SMT solver and identifies an end
to end slice for each checking. However, VMN only supports block intents and cannot
scale to large networks with dynamic updates.
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Chapter 5
AutoInfer: Automated Network Intent
Inference
5.1 Motivation
Consider an operator planning to write an intent to improve the resilience of a Web
service hosted in the enterprise data center. In order to decide the bandwidth require-
ment, the operator wants to learn what intents about the Web service have already been
deployed and how resilient is the current deployment. An intuitive approach is to run
start of the art network verification techniques over network configurations and collect-
ing all potential accesses related to the Web service. While the runtime network state
will be missing from this analysis, it may derive inaccurate network intents. We present
three examples which motivate our idea in AutoInfer to augment configuration analysis
with runtime monitoring.
Fig. 5.1 shows an example of endpoints migration, which could happen due to com-
pany reorganization or a department/team moving into a new office. While new con-
figurations are installed to support new intents related to the migration, the old ones
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Mktg
IT1
IT2
Figure 5.1: Example of endpoints migration. Endpoint group IT1 migrates to IT2. The
original intent between IT1 and Mktg no longer exists.
may still exist in the configuration file [16]. As shown in Fig. 5.1, IT department moves
from IT1 to IT2. The original communication intent from IT1 to Marketing department
Mktg may still be inferred, but without any active traffic.
Web1
Mktg
Web2
Route
Figure 5.2: Example of rule aggregation. The aggregated route for both Web1 and
Web2 is still valid when Web1 goes down for emergency maintenance. Web1 cannot
be accessed.
To achieve high availability, services may migrate more often compared to end-
points. As shown in Fig. 5.2, there are two Web services Web1 and Web2. Both of
them advertise their routes from the left to the right side. The two routes are aggregated
into a single route on their way to the Marketing department Mktg since they share the
same prefix. WhenWeb1 experiences an emergency maintenance, existing connections
and states on Web1 are migrated to Web2. As Web2 is still alive, the original aggre-
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gated route will stay valid [47]. However, the inferred intent from Mktg to Web1 does
no longer exist since Web1 cannot be accessed at the moment.
LBBC
IDS
WebGuest
BC
Figure 5.3: Example of equal-cost paths. Though the upper (traverses a byte counter
and a load balancer) and lower (traverses an Intrusion Detection System(IDS) and a
byte counter) paths between Guest network and the Web service have the same cost,
only one path is active at a time.
Finally, another misleading intent may be inferred from configurations when there
are multiple equal-cost paths between the source and destination endpoint groups. As
shown in Fig. 5.3, between the Guest network and the Web service, there are two paths
with the same hop count but different function boxes. While there seems to be a con-
flict between the two intents inferred along the two paths, this is an example of policy
routing [25], only one path/intent is active at a particular time .
5.2 Overview
Next, we provide an intuitive description of AutoInfer (see Fig. 5.4) using a running
example.
Input. AutoInfer relies on three input from operators or network OSes: labels,
dataplane rules and topologies. No other input is required during the intent inference
process. Labels refer to predefined names representing endpoint groups, which are
commonly used in existing network management tools and applications [5] [20]. La-
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Figure 5.4: Workflow of AutoInfer
bels are naturally organized in tree structures. More specifically, as shown in Fig. 5.5a,
the example network has seven predefined labels including three departments (IT, Mar-
keting, Guest) and two applications (Data Base, Web). Each label corresponds to a set
of IP addresses or prefixes. AutoInfer also accepts network topology and dataplane con-
figurations (e.g., forwarding/ACL rules) in order to compute potential intents. Fig. 5.5b
shows the topology of the example network consisting of six switches (s1 to s6) and
several function boxes.
From configurations to individual intents. Given network configurations, Au-
toInfer obtains potential intents by calculating network reachability between each pair
of edge ports along all simple paths. Intersected with the label definition, we can in-
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Figure 5.5: A running example of AutoInfer
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fer locations of endpoints and their corresponding intents (see Fig. 5.5b). Note that an
endpoint group may partially belong to an intent. To represent sub-endpoint groups,
AutoInfer creates labels with subscripts. As shown in Fig. 5.5b, some endpoints in the
IT department may sit behind switch s1, denoted as it1, and are able to talk to Web.
This intent is represented as it1 − w. We call such potential intents individual intents.
Following this method, AutoInfer spells out all potential individual intents.
Fig. 5.5c shows the all individual intents calculated using the network configura-
tions. An individual intent can be monitored on the switches along its forwarding path
between the source and destination endpoints (Numbers in parentheses represent poten-
tial monitoring spots for corresponding intents). In order to show how AutoInfer works,
we assume a subset of individual intents has active traffic, marked with a star at the end
of an intent. Note that the function boxes which modify packet headers introduce addi-
tional constraints on which spot an intent can be monitored. For example, traffic for the
intent it1 − w(4, 6) goes through the path s1 → s2 → s4 → s6. However, since the
load balancer may modify destination addresses, only the downward switches (s4 and
s6) are valid monitoring spots for the intent.
Adaptive monitoring refinement. With the individual intents extracted from the
configurations, AutoInfer conducts monitoring to further infer network intents from the
runtime state. Since different intents could contend for more resources than available
in the network, it may not be possible to monitor all intent all the time. Monitoring
schedules in AutoInfer are made of one or more timeslots. While it is intuitive to spend
more resources measuring intents with active traffic, a current latent intent may become
active in seconds. To assure fairness, monitoring schedules are initialized periodically.
The length of the cycle is chosen to be the minimum number of timeslots to monitor
each individual intent for at least once. In the running example, we assume a switch can
monitor at most one intent at a time. Limited by the switch resource budget, it takes
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at least four timeslots to schedule each individual intent at least once. As shown by
the timeslots surrounded by dotted lines in the fixed monitoring schedule of Fig. 5.5d,
switches s4 and s6 become bottlenecks for intents between IT, Marketing and Web ser-
vice. Other timeslots are filled accordingly and we call this a minimum fixed schedule.
After the schedule for a cycle is decided, all intents are continuously monitored by
repeating the minimum schedule.
Limitations of such fixed schedules are: 1) Some intents may experience long de-
lay before they are initially monitored (e.g., intent it3 − w isn’t monitored until the
fourth timeslot), which further delays any reaction operators may take by observing
such intents. 2) Some intents without active traffic are monitored repeatedly (e.g., in-
tent it1 −m3 is monitored four times while an active intent it3 − w is monitored only
once). Therefore, those slots are wasted and won’t contribute to the intent graphs.
An improvement is to aggregate individual intents to high level intents based on the
input label trees (e.g., Intents m1 − w, m2 − w and m3 − w are aggregated to m− w).
High level intents are scheduled with higher priority whereas a sub-intent is scheduled
only if its high level intent has active traffic. Otherwise, the sub-intents will not be
monitored within the same cycle. However, an overly aggregated scheme may lead
to resource underutilization. In an extreme case, all individual intents are aggregated
into a single high level intent and thus only one intent is available to schedule, leaving
other switch rearouses wasted. To address the problem, the monitoring schedule in
AutoInfer is refined adaptively with objectives to maximize intent coverage as well as
resource utilization (see the adaptive monitoring schedule in Fig. 5.5d).
Compared with the fixed monitoring schedule, the adaptive monitoring schedule
brings two benefits: 1) In addition to individual intents, it can also generates intent
graphs for aggregated intents which provide operators with a high level view of network
states in a timely manner. It’s especially useful when many intents exist. 2) On the other
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hand, it improves the efficiency of the monitoring by giving up the inactive intents at
an early stage and only focuses on active intents. As shown in Fig. 5.5d, in the fixed
monitoring schedule, 10 out of 24 slots do not capture any traffic, the ratio is decreased
by x2.5 to 4/24 in the adaptive monitoring schedule.
Output. Labels are often defined over network structures or company organiza-
tions. New policy labels can be inferred based on obtained intent graphs to suggest
operators configure and reorganize their networks. As shown in Fig. 5.5e, it3 and g1 ∼ 3
are included in a public (pub) group since they all have accesses to the Web service
while it2 and m3 are forming a private (pri) group.
Using labels, intent graphs are displayed to operators and are continuously updated
based on the captured traffic. Fig. 5.5f shows intents graphs AutoInfer created for the
running example.
5.3 From Configurations to Individual Intents
Given input configurations, the first operation performed by AutoInfer is to identify
individual intents and their potential monitoring spots. We now detail how this happens.
Network Models. We follow existing work on network verification [63] [118] to
model a packet header as a flat sequence of ones and zeros. Formally, a header is a
point in the {0, 1}L space, where L is an upper bound on the header length. A wildcard
expression is a sequence of L bits where each bit can be either 0, 1 or x. The whole
header space is defined as a union of wildcard expressions.
We model the network as a set of boxes with external ports. A box is modeled using
a transfer function T :
T (h, p) : (h, p) → {(h1, p1), (h2, p2), ...} (5.1)
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In general, the transfer function may depend on the input port to model input-port-
specific behavior and the output may be a set of header-port pairs to allow multicasting.
More precisely, transfer functions model their protocol dependent functions. For in-
stance, an IP lookup can be modeled by a masking AND while header updates can be
represented by a masking AND followed by a rewrite OR.
Computing Individual Intents. For each edge port, we consider the space of all
headers leaving the source, then track this space as it is transformed by each succes-
sive box along a simple path. This process terminates when either another edge port is
reached or no header space remains. If an edge port is reached, we trace the remain-
ing header space backwards (using the inverse function at each step) to find the set of
headers the source can send to reach the destination. For a simple path with reachable
source and destination addresses, we intersect them with the pre-defined labels to get an
individual intent. Switches along the path are potential monitoring spots for the intent.
If an intent contains a function box which modifies destination addresses, monitoring
spots are restricted to its downward switches where traffic can be captured with correct
destinations. Similarly, for a function box which modifies source addresses, the mon-
itoring spots can only be its upward switches. An alert is triggered when no available
monitoring spot is found.
5.4 Adaptive monitoring refinement
After analyzing configurations, we end up with a group of individual intents and
their potential monitoring spot. The next step performed by AutoInfer is to schedule
those monitoring tasks, creating network intent graphs. While it is intuitive to seek
high monitoring efficiency (e.g., to spend more resources on intents with active traffic),
AutoInfer also values the fairness among all intents (e.g., to monitor each intent as often
as possible). To achieve the goal, AutoInfer firstly identifies a minimum cycle in which
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Type Symbol Meaning
C
on
st
an
t
T the set of all timeslots
Wi weight assigned to intent i based on importance
CAPs capacity of swtich s
α weight assigned to the second objective of maximizing switch utiliza-
tion
ρ weight of penalty for changing the spot for a continuous monitoring
task
V
ar
ia
bl
e Iit indicator variable set as 1 if intent i is scheduled at timeslot t
Pist indicator variable set as 1 if intent i is monitored at switch s at times-
lot t
Ut indicator variable set as 1 if any monitoring task is assigned at times-
lot t
δs slack variable for switch s
θis penalty to represent changing of monitoring spot assignment for in-
tent i
Table 5.1: Symbols and notions.
each individual intent can be scheduled for at least once. Monitoring schedules are
initialized at the beginning of each cycle. Within a cycle, AutoInfer adaptively refines
monitoring schedules to compute a maximum filling for each timeslot, hence increasing
inference accuracy.
Symbols and functions. Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 list the symbols and functions
used in our formulation, along with their meanings.
5.4.1 Calculating a minimum cycle
To identify the length of a minimum cycle, we need to schedule each individual
intent for exactly one timeslot, with the goal to minimize the total number of timeslots.
This problem can be reduced from a bin packing problem, and therefore it is NP-hard.
To improve time efficiency, AutoInfer first computes an upper bound on the size of
the minimal cycle, using a First-Fit heuristic which schedules all intents in increasing
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Function Meaning
indivInts returns all individual intents
switches returns all switches
spots(i) returns available monitoring spots for intent i
ints returns all potential intents for the current timeslot
descInts(i) returns all descendants of intent i in the current intent pool
actInts returns all monitored intents having active traffic in the current timeslot
actSpot(i) returns the spot selected to monitor intent i in the current timeslot
Table 5.2: Functions and notions.
order with respect to the number of monitoring spots. The computed upper bound is
then exploited to compute a minimum cycle, using a Integer Linear Program (ILP)
formulation.
We use indicator variables, also known as binary variables, which can take the value
of 0 or 1. For example, Ut is an indicator variable for timeslot t ∈ T . It will take the
value 1 if any intent is scheduled to be monitored in timeslot t. The goal is to minimize
the length of a cycle.
Objective : min
∑
t∈T
Ut (5.2)
The objective should be achieved with the following constraints:
Every individual intent must be scheduled. ∀i ∈ indivInts:
∑
s∈spots(i)
∑
t∈T
Pist = 1 (5.3)
In any timeslot, monitoring tasks assigned to a switch must be equal or less than its
capacity. ∀ t ∈ T,∀ s ∈ switches:
∑
i∈indivInts
Pist ≤ Ut × CAPs (5.4)
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A timeslot is used if any intent has been scheduled to be monitored in the timeslot.
∀ t ∈ T : ∑
i∈indivInts
∑
s∈ switches
Pist ≥ Ut (5.5)
Intent should be scheduled to timeslots in sequence. ∀ t, t′ ∈ T, t ≤ t′:
Ut ≥ Ut′ (5.6)
5.4.2 Calculating a maximum filling
Within a cycle, a maximum filling is calculated for each timeslot. The primary goal
is to maximize the intent coverage and its secondary goals are to maximize resource
utilization and minimize spot changes during the monitoring process. Before we show
the optimization problem and the heuristic algorithm to achieve our goals, we first
explain how to identify potential intents and how they can be adaptively refined across
different timeslots.
Identify potential intents. As shown in the running example in Fig. 5.5, aggregated
intents are helpful to quickly get rid of inactive intents, leaving more resources for
active intents. However, not every aggregated intent is useful and needless aggregation
may increase the number of potential intents, slowing down the scheduling process.
AutoInfer first creates an intent relationship graph and then prunes redundant intents.
The remaining intents in the graph are the set of potential intents to be monitored.
Fig. 5.6 shows an example intent relationship graph built using a subset of individ-
ual intents (on the right side) from our running example. We can see that an intent is
upgraded by either source or destination label each time. An arrow points from a father
intent to all its children intents. The pruning process starts from the left, removing all
intents which cover the same set of individual intents as their children. In the example,
only three aggregated intents are left, shown in green boxes.
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𝑖𝑡1 − 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠
𝑖𝑡2 − 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠
𝑖𝑡3 − 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠
𝐼𝑇 − 𝑤
𝑖𝑡1 −𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑔
𝑖𝑡2 −𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑔
𝐼𝑇 −𝑚3
𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠 − 𝑤
𝑤 − 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠
𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠 − 𝑑𝑏
𝑖𝑡1 − 𝑤
𝑖𝑡2 −𝑤
𝑖𝑡3 −𝑤
𝑖𝑡1 −𝑚3
𝑖𝑡2 −𝑚3
𝑤 − 𝑤
𝑤 − 𝑑𝑏
𝐷𝑝𝑡𝑠 − 𝑤
𝐼𝑇 − 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠
𝐼𝑇 −𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑔
𝑖𝑡1 − 𝐷𝑝𝑡𝑠
𝑖𝑡2 − 𝐷𝑝𝑡𝑠
𝐷𝑝𝑡𝑠 − 𝑚3
𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠 − 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠
𝐷𝑝𝑡𝑠 − 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠
𝐷𝑝𝑡𝑠 −𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑔
𝐼𝑇 − 𝐷𝑝𝑡𝑠
𝐷𝑝𝑡𝑠 − 𝐷𝑝𝑡𝑠
Figure 5.6: Example of an intent relationship graph
By computing the intersection of monitoring spots of individual intents, we can
obtain the monitoring spots for the corresponding aggregated intent. Note that the
potential intents only need to be calculated once and can be reused for all cycles.
Refining intent list. Across different timeslots within a cycle, the potential intent
list is refined adaptively based on what intents have been scheduled and their monitoring
results in previous timeslots. More specifically, AutoInfer follows three rules to update
the intent list:
1. Once an intent is scheduled, remove all its ancestors from the intent list.
2. If an intent is measured to be inactive, all its descendants including itself are
removed.
3. If an aggregated intent is active, just remove the intent itself. Its descendants will
stay in the intent list.
Ancestor and descendant intents can be obtained easily by traversing the intent re-
lationship graph. The intent list is reset to the original set when a new cycle starts.
Maximizing intent coverage. Monitoring scheduling depends on switch capacity.
For a timeslot, it may not possible to schedule all intents at once. The primary goal of
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the scheduling is to maximize the intent coverage, defined as the weighted sum of all
potential intents. AutoInfer uses weight to represent the importance of an intent. The
weight of an aggregated intents is calculated as the sum of weights of all its individual
descendants.
Objective : max
∑
i∈ints
Wi Ii (5.7)
There are three constraints that need to be considered in formulating the optimiza-
tion problem. If intent i is scheduled, i.e., Ii = 1, exactly one monitoring spot should
be reserved.
∀i ∈ ints: ∑
s∈spots(i)
Pis = Ii (5.8)
The total number of intents scheduled to be monitored on a switch should be less
than the switch capacity.
∀s ∈ switches: ∑
i∈ ints
Pis ≤ CAPs (5.9)
To avoid double booking, an intent and its descendants should not be scheduled for
the same timeslot.
∀i ∈ ints, Ii = 1: ⋃
j∈ descInt(i)
Ij = 0 (5.10)
An ILP that considers all potential monitoring spots spots(i) of an intent may be-
come inefficient since the number of spots grows with the size of the network. AutoIn-
fer uses a heuristic algorithm [58] which uses a random subset of valid monitoring spot
as the candidate spots.
Maxmizing resource utilization. While scheduling more high level aggregated
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intents improves intent coverage, there will be far less remaining intents that can be
scheduled, leaving the resource wasted. Slack variables are introduced for switches to
represent unused capacity.
∀s ∈ switches: ∑
i∈ ints
Pis = CAPs − δs (5.11)
We incorporate slack variables as penalty in the objective function and use variable
α to control the weight of the penalty associated with the total wasted capacity. By
increasing α, we can ensure maximum utilization is guaranteed.
Objective : max
∑
i∈ints
Wi Ii − α×
∑
s∈switches
δs (5.12)
Minimizing monitoring spot changes. For an intent which is scheduled for mul-
tiple continuous timeslots, changing its monitoring spot requires activating as well as
deactivating monitoring rules at switches and may lead to additional changes at other
switches. While obtaining an optimized schedule for all timeslots is hard, we use a
greedy approach, adding a secondary goal of minimizing monitoring spot changes from
the previous optimization solution. Indicator variables associated with switches can be
used as a signal to represent monitoring spot changes. The value of Pis for switch s
and intent i can change from 1 in the initial solution to 0 in the new solution in two
scenarios: 1) intent i is monitored at some other switch, and, 2) no switch is config-
ured to monitor intent i. Both require modifying monitoring rules. We minimize such
changes using a variables θis. As shown in Eqn. 5.13, for an active intent i ∈ actInts,
changing the value of Pis from 1 to 0 in the new solution will set θis to 1. These vari-
ables represent monitoring spot changes and are used to create the penalty function in
Eqn. 5.14.
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∀i ∈ actInts, s = actSpot(i):
Pis = Ii − θis (5.13)
Similar to Eqn. 5.12, AutoInfer uses another variable ρ to control the penalty asso-
ciated with spot changes. The main objective is still maximizing intent coverage, which
can be achieved by assigning ρ a low value.
Objective : max
∑
i∈ ints
Wi Ii − ρ×
∑
i∈ actInts
θis (5.14)
5.5 Evaluation
We start by evaluating the algorithm pipeline of AutoInfer using synthetic bench-
marks over realistic topologies, to answer the questions: 1) Can AutoInfer improve the
accuracy of intent inference? 2) Does it scale to large networks and is suitable for on-
line use? Then, we validate the useability of AutoInfer using an emulated testbed on
Mininet [72].
5.5.1 Methodology
Benchmarks. We select fifteen topologies from Internet Topology Zoo [67] and
group them into three categories, namely Small, Medium and Large based on their
size. The Small networks have approximately thirty nodes while Medium and Large
networks have one hundred and two hundred nodes respectively. We create label trees
ranging from two to four levels. Each leaf label is further divided into five sub-labels.
To obtain endpoints, we randomly attach all leaf labels to different nodes in each net-
work. Potential individual intents and their corresponding monitoring spots are cal-
culated as shortest-paths based on the number of hops between endpoints. For each
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Figure 5.7: Time cost of intent aggregation
experiment, we randomly sample a number of individual intents as the input for the in-
tent aggregation process and gradually increase the input size to evaluate the scalability
of AutoInfer. Unless specified otherwise, the number of candidate monitoring spots for
each intent is limited to five. The capacity of a switch is set to one. That is, only one
monitoring task can be assigned to a switch at a time. The weight of each individual
intent is set to one and the weight of an aggregated intent is obtained by adding weights
of all its individual descendant intents.
We implemented an AutoInfer prototype using Python and Gurobi [9], a state of
the art ILP solver. We performed more than one hundred experiments for all topologies
and report the average for each algorithm. All our experiments were done on a machine
with eight cores, 3.40 GHz Intel Core i7-6700 Processor and 32 GB RAM.
5.5.2 Intent Aggregation
Given a set of individual intents, AutoInfer first performs the intent aggregation
process to obtain a list of potential intents for the monitoring phase. Fig. 5.7 shows the
execution time of intent aggregation for Small, Medium and Large networks. We can
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Figure 5.8: CDF of growth rate of number of intents
see that the time cost grows slightly with the size of input individual intents increasing
from one hundred to one thousand, which confirms that algorithms used in the intent
aggregation are linear in the size of input intents. The maximum cost is still less than
0.06 seconds. For most of experiments, networks of different size share similar time
costs. This is because the only difference in this phase between different networks is
calculating potential monitoring spots to determine if an intent should be pruned. Such
calculations are very efficient and do not incur notable delays for large networks.
While adding aggregated intents improves the monitoring efficiency, it also in-
creases the size of potential intent list, which may slow down the monitoring scheduling
process. Label trees with larger depth tend to introduce more aggregated intents. To
study how much the size of intent list increases, we calculate the growth rate as the
number of intents after aggregation divided by the number of input individual intents
for each experiment and show the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) in Fig. 5.8.
From the figure, we can see that growth rates of all networks fall between 1.8 and 2.6.
The intent size of 80% of networks increases less than 2.4x.
Note that the intent aggregation only need to be performed once and the result intent
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Figure 5.9: Time cost to identify the minimum cycle
list remains the same for further cycles if the network does not change. The speed of
intent aggregation affects AutoInfer’s ability to recompute the intent list online. A
smaller execution time enables AutoInfer to quickly react to changes (e.g., link failures
and routing changes), hence improves the accuracy of inferred intents.
5.5.3 Scheduling Performance
Calculating the minimum cycle. In AutoInfer, monitoring schedules are orga-
nized in minimum cycles. We first evaluate the time cost to identify the length of the
minimum cycle using the approximated heuristic (App.) and the optimized (Opt.) algo-
rithm discussed in Sec. 5.4.1. Fig. 5.9 shows the time cost for different networks when
the number of input individual intents is equal to two hundred, six hundred and one
thousand. We find that the approximated method is extremely fast and the largest cost
among all experiments is less than 10 ms. In contrast, the cost of the optimized method
grows exponentially with respect to the number of input intents. For all networks, the
costs can be up to tens of seconds when there are one thousand individual intents.
We remind that identifying the minimum cycle is also a one-time calculation and
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Topology Optimality Gap (%)
200
intents
400
intents
600
intents
800
intents
1000
intents
Small 4.3 4.9 3.6 3.9 3.9
Medium 13.3 0 7.9 1.6 4.4
Large 20.8 15.4 7.7 10.6 8.4
Table 5.3: Optimality gap between the approximated heuristic and optimized algo-
rithm.
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Figure 5.10: Time cost to compute a monitoring schedule
can be done offline. Though the optimized method costs more time, it achieves a
smaller cycle length in most of experiments. Table 5.3 shows the optimality gap ( lenApp−lenOpt
lenOpt
)
between minimum cycles obtained by the approximated and the optimized method. In
most cases, the optimality gap is smaller than 10%. The largest gap is 20.8% for Large
networks with two hundred input intents.
Calculating a maximum filling. Within a cycle, AutoInfer refines the monitor-
ing schedule across each timeslot adaptively. LP solvers like Gurobi use “warm start”,
which allow them to start from the existing solution. For minor changes in constraints
or objective functions, “warm start” can be significantly faster [9]. AutoInfer takes ad-
vantage of “warm start” and avoids an exhausted calculation by adaptively updating the
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Figure 5.11: CCDF of increased slots allocation
potential intent list for each time slot. Fig. 5.10 shows the execution time to compute
the initial and the rest of monitoring schedules (denoted as (I) and (R)). As shown in
the figure, the average cost to compute a monitoring schedule with “warm start” in-
creases slightly with the number of input intents. Compared with the initial calculation,
it reduces the time cost by at least an order of magnitude for Medium and Large net-
works. In AutoInfer, after an initial monitoring schedule is obtained, it is reused at the
beginning of each cycle and refined adaptively within a cycle. Therefore, the maximum
cost to compute a monitoring schedule is less than 0.15 seconds, which highlights that
AutoInfer is suitable for online use.
Optimization gain. We evaluate the optimization gain of AutoInfer over a fixed
monitoring schedule, in which a cycle filled with a fixed monitoring plan of individual
intents is repeated continuously. The optimization gain is calculated as the average
number of time slots assigned to each active intent using AutoInfer divided by the
corresponding number using the fixed schedules. Fig.5.11 shows the Complementary
Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF) of the optimization gain. We can see that
60% of experiments for Medium and Large networks have increased the slots allocation
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Figure 5.12: Resource utilization with different penalty weight
by at least 3.7x. For Small networks, that value goes up to 5.4x.
Resource utilization. Here we show that having a high penalty weight (α) asso-
ciated with the unused switch capacity allows us to schedule more intents, and hence
higher resource utilization rate. Resource utilization in this experiment is calculated
as the ratio of the number of intents scheduled to the total capacity of switches. We
vary the penalty weight (α) from zero to eight. As shown in Fig. 5.12, the resource uti-
lization rate is directly proportional to α. Note that increasing the utilization requires
more low level intents to be scheduled which may decrease the intent coverage as the
primary goal. Setting α to 3.0 allows AutoInfer provides a decent intent coverage while
still enabling it to keep wasted resources as low as 10%.
Reducing monitoring spot changes. Here we evaluate the performance of our
greedy algorithm to reduce monitoring spot changes. We increase ρ in Eqn. 5.14 from
0 to 1. For intents that are scheduled for two consecutive time slots, we measure the
percentage of the intents with the same monitoring spots for all networks. As shown
in Fig. 5.13, with ρ equals to 0, about 40% of intents are monitored at the same spots
for Small networks. For Medium and Large networks,only less than 30% of intents are
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Figure 5.13: Performance of heuristic algorithm to reduce spot changes
assigned with the same spots. When ρ increases, the corresponding percentage quickly
goes up to at least 70% for all networks. In AutoInfer, we set ρ to 0.2 since all larger
values of ρ achieve similar performance and a lower ρ should be selected to maximize
the primary goal.
5.5.4 Testbed Evaluation
To evaluate the practicality of AutoInfer, we integrate our prototype into Mininet
running Open vSwitch v2.5.8 [17].
Intent monitoring. Most commercial routers and software switches (e.g., Open
vSwitch, P4 switches [19]) support counting packets/bytes that matches a rule (e.g., an
IPv4 five-tuple, a VLAN tag) using a counter. To monitor intents, AutoInfer installs
rules on switches to passively collect those counters. Due to resource constraints, most
routers or switches only support a limited amount of counters [126] [108], so as limited
counted criteria, which prevents AutoInfer from capturing practical intents consisting
of a large number of flows. To overcome this limitation, AutoInfer triggers intent mon-
itoring using dynamic ACLs. More specifically, counters on switches are configured to
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match a specific tag. AutoInfer then dynamically update ACLs to add that tag to only
the packets belonging to the intent to be monitored. Monitoring rules are activated by
executing a pre-loaded script on each switch. The script specifies a list of flows for an
intent and an active duration.
Choice of timeslot duration. AutoInfer schedules small monitoring tasks lasting
for one timeslot. The length of a timeslot should be selected based on the used mon-
itoring technology. To test how short a timeslot can be in our testbed, we create two
end hosts connected with a single switch, with one host sending packets to the other at
full speed. We write a script to periodically query the packet/byte count correspond-
ing to the rule which forwards packets between two hosts. An observation is that the
counter in Open vSwitch is not updated in real-time, which determines the minimum
timeslot we can have in AutoInfer. We gradually increase the time interval between two
queries util the counter reflects the real-time traffic volume correctly. In the following
experiment, we conservatively set the timeslot length to 500 ms.
Intent inference accuracy. To show the practicality of AutoInfer, we measure the
intent inference accuracy in Mininet using the network from our running example (see
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Fig.5.5). Besides the individual intents shown in the example, we add more potential
intents from IT to Data Base, IT to Marketing and Guest to Marketing, making the
total number of 32 individual intents. By applying the calculation in Section 5.4.1,
the length of the minimum cycle is set to 6 timeslots. For each cycle, endpoints in
the network generate traffic for each individual intent with a probability of of 40%.
The inference accuracy is defined as the percentage of active intents the monitoring
algorithm has captured for the current cycle. To show the improvement of AutoInfer,
we also evaluate the performance of the fixed scheduling and random sampling. The
fixed scheduling calculates a fixed monitoring plan for all individual intents ensuring
that each intent is monitored at least once. The plan is repeated for all the cycles. The
random sampling randomly decides which intent to monitor at a spot for each timeslot.
The length of a timelsot is set to 500 ms. Fig. 5.14 shows the inference accuracy of the
three methods. From the figure, we see that both AutoInfer and the fixed scheduling are
able to capture all active intents before the end of each cycle while the random sampling
cannot provide guarantee on accuracy. For most of cycles, AutoInfer captures all active
intents within two timeslots which is 2x faster than the fixed scheduling. This result
is consistent with the optimization gain of AutoInfer since more timeslots will be only
allocated to active intents.
5.6 Related work
Recent work on network policy management [30,66,92,105] have enabled network
operators to create different types of network intents more expressively and conve-
niently. Their work mostly focus on the techniques that operators can use to specify
their intents and how the intents are converted into each details of practical deploy-
ment. However, in many cases, knowing what intent to create is hard and our work
complements existing policy specifications to assist operators to understand the run-
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time network state. Considerable work have been done on network monitoring and
they can be broadly divided into two categories. Some example work [74, 101, 119]
designed various sketch-based structures to support different monitoring applications.
Some other work [83, 107] discussed monitoring frameworks that cooperate switches
and end hosts. Our monitoring algorithm is similar to [108]. While it focuses on moni-
toring pre-defined flows, our work tries to extract such popular flows from all potential
flows and keeps adapting to the runtime network state. A recent work [39] proposed
a tool to assist network operators in reasoning network forwarding behaviors. It used
a heuristic algorithm to summarize the traffic forwarding records. Our work aims to
assist operators to create or refine network intents for a running network and does not
rely on any pre-knowledge of the runtime network state. Companies [4,27] working on
IBN have also included features on automated intent inference. Most of those functions
are based on best practice of network management. While such functions can provide
generic advices, our work is compatible with them and can be combined to provide a
comprehensive network intent inference functionality.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Managing a large packet network is a complex task. Network management benefits
from automated tools to fulfill each functionality in its control loop. This dissertation
presents efficient methods to improve the reliability and useability of network automa-
tion.
We propose AP Classifier for network-wide packet behavior identification that can
be utilized by many important network management applications. We design algo-
rithms to construct the AP Tree for a network, which can be used to quickly classify
a packet to an atomic predicate. Each atomic predicate represents the network-wide
forwarding behaviors of a set of packets. Experimental results using the datasets of two
real networks show that the proposed AP Tree construction algorithm can optimize the
average depth of leaf nodes. AP Classifier can process millions of packet queries per
second. The speed is faster than existing tools by at least an order of magnitude. Fur-
thermore, it uses only a few MBs memory. It can be updated in real time and is robust
under dynamic data plane changes.
As an application of AP Classifier, we present SICS, a middlebox outsourcing
framework that protects the private information of packet headers and middlebox rules.
Compared with existing methods, SICS has several unique advantages including a
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stronger security guarantee, high-throughput processing, and support for quick updates.
SICS assigns each packet a label identifying its matching behavior in a service chain
and all middlebox processing in the cloud is based on labels. We use a prototype imple-
mentation and evaluation on VPC and local computers to demonstrate the feasibility,
high performance, and efficiency of SICS.
We present our intent checking solution, Epinoia. Epinoia efficiently supports state-
ful networks with a variety of network functions. Epinoia includes vendor-agnostic net-
work function modeling combined with capturing causality precedence relationships
for incremental intent checking. A comprehensive evaluation shows that Epinoia can
check network intents in under 10 seconds per network update and reduce checking
time by a factor of up to 100x compared with a full checking for all intents.
Creating or updating network intents is an essential component in Intent Based Net-
working. We present AutoInfer, our automated network intent inference tool for run-
ning networks. AutoInfer first analyzes network configurations to extract all potential
intents and then utilizes an adaptive refinement scheme to conduct runtime monitoring.
The output of AutoInfer are network intent graphs for the runtime states. Experimental
results based on realistic benchmarks show that AutoInfer achieves higher inference
accuracy compared with existing solutions and is suitable for online use.
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